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POLICING, TECHNOLOGY, AND DOCTRINAL ASSISTS
Bennett Capers* **?
Abstract
Sounding the alarm about technology, policing, and privacy has 
become an almost daily occurrence. We are told that the government’s
use of technology as a surveillance tool is an “insidious assault on our 
freedom.” That it is “nearly impossible to live today without generating 
thousands of records about what we watch, read, buy and do—and the 
government has access to them.” The message is clear. Big Brother is 
watching. And we should be afraid.
But the police use of technology, or what this Article terms “techno-
policing,” does not have to be dystopian. This Article challenges 
conventional thinking and offers an entirely new way to think about 
technology and policing. Deployed properly, techno-policing—from the 
use of simple smartphone applications such as FaceTime and Google 
Hangout, to the deployment of high-tech surveillance cameras, terahertz 
scanners, Big Data, and Automated Suspicion Algorithms—can enhance 
the warrant requirement and the goals of transparency and accuracy. And
at this time when crime levels are relatively low and there are growing 
demands for police accountability—think Black Lives Matter—techno-
policing can enhance legitimacy. Most importantly, techno-policing can
provide much needed doctrinal assists where Fourth Amendment 
doctrine alone has proved inadequate, shortsighted, and unfair.
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INTRODUCTION
Sounding the alarm about technology, the Fourth Amendment, and 
privacy has become an almost daily occurrence. We are told that the 
government’s use of technology as a surveillance tool is an “insidious 
assault on our freedom.”1 That it is “nearly impossible to live today 
without generating thousands of records about what we watch, read, buy 
and do—and the government has access to them.”2 That so long as 
“Fourth Amendment privacy is parasitical on private-sphere privacy, the 
former must die as its host dies, and this host is undoubtedly faltering 
today in the networked, monitored, and digitized world we are learning 
to call our own.”3 In short, that privacy is becoming like “the eight-track 
player, something we once had but which isn’t of use.”4 The message is 
clear: Big Brother is watching. We should be afraid.
But the police use of technology, or what this Article terms “techno-
policing,” does not have to be dystopian. For too long we have fixated 
with foreboding on the government’s use of technology vis-à-vis its 
citizens, and the inadequacy of Fourth Amendment doctrine to rein in that 
use. We have only begun to “flip the script,” so to speak, and think about 
                                                                                                                     
1. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE 
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT ix (2007).
2. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY AND 
SECURITY 2 (2011).
3. Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 118 (2008).
4. Anne Cassidy, Who’s Watching You?, GEO. L. RES IPSA LOQUITUR, Spring/Summer 
2015, at 20, 27 (quoting David Cole).
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the ability of citizens to insist on the use of technology such as body 
cameras to make policing more accountable. But body cameras should be 
the start, not the end, of the use of technology. Focusing for now on the 
Fourth Amendment’s regulation of searches and seizures, this Article 
argues that it is time to harness technologies—from simple smartphone 
applications like FaceTime and Voice Memos, to the deployment of 
terahertz scanners, to Big Data and Automated Suspicion Algorithms, to 
the use of dedicated short-range communications technology—that can 
also further Fourth Amendment protections.5 Most importantly, where 
Fourth Amendment doctrine has proved inadequate, these technologies 
can provide doctrinal assists.
This Article unfolds in four parts, beginning with simple technology 
and progressing to more complex technology. The primary objective of 
each part, though interconnected, is also different. In Part I, the focus is 
the heart of the Fourth Amendment—the warrant requirement—and the 
“assists” that simple communication platforms such as the smartphone 
applications FaceTime and Google Hangout can provide. By way of 
example, Part I focuses on two exceptions to the warrant requirement that 
have in effect swallowed the rule—the automobile exception and the 
exigency exception—and demonstrates how technology can get us closer 
to the original understanding of the Fourth Amendment.
Part II turns to technologies that can provide another doctrinal assist: 
transparency. Again, the call for police officers to wear body cameras is 
well-known. “Copwatching”—the practice of citizen groups organizing 
to monitor and record the police—is less well-known, but is also 
receiving attention.6 This Part accordingly focuses on two other
technologies that can aid in transparency. The first is of a piece with body 
cameras and copwatching: public surveillance cameras. To be sure, 
public surveillance cameras can capture and make visible police use of 
excessive force. But equally important and more generally, public 
surveillance cameras can make visible, and hence reviewable, everyday 
police interactions with citizens. For example, one of Terry v. Ohio’s7
most glaring flaws is that it allows officers to justify ex post stops based 
on reasonable suspicion.8 After all, Terry requires “articulable”
                                                                                                                     
5. In a way, this project shares much with author David Brin’s observation that it is already 
far too late to prevent the government use of surveillance cameras and databases: “The djinn
cannot be crammed back into its bottle . . . . The real issue . . . will be how mature adults choose 
to live—how they can compete, cooperate, and thrive—in such a world. A transparent society.”
DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE US TO CHOOSE BETWEEN 
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? 8–9 (1998).
6. See generally Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 391 (2016)
(describing the phenomenon of organized copwatching).
7. 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
8. Id. at 30.
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suspicion,9 not articulated suspicion. Public surveillance cameras can do 
some of the work in presenting a record, ex post, of whether officers were 
justified in their actions ex ante. A second technology, digital audio 
recorders, can address another recurring Fourth Amendment problem: 
determining the validity of consent and leveling the playing field with 
respect to consent. Both of these technologies, insofar as they aid 
transparency, can also bring attention to areas of policing that lie outside 
the scope of the Fourth Amendment and increase perceptions of 
legitimacy.
Part III turns to newer surveillance technology—terahertz scanners, 
facial recognition software, Big Data, and Automated Suspicion 
Algorithms, to name a few—and to yet a third objective: accuracy. It 
focuses on stop-and-frisks as a policing tool. Given the sheer volume of 
innocent citizens subjected to forcible stops and widespread evidence of 
racial profiling, the overuse and misuse of this policing tool is particularly 
troubling. Part III demonstrates that here too technology can provide a 
doctrinal assist to curb the overuse and misuse of stop-and-frisks by 
increasing accuracy. 
Finally, Part IV turns to the role legislators and courts can play in
facilitating the adoption of rights-enhancing technology. It then 
anticipates and addresses potential counter-arguments.
For too long, the conventional thinking among Fourth Amendment 
scholars has been that technology will usurp what little privacy we have 
left. In short, scholars have seen technology as the enemy. But citizens 
too can use technology, and use it in ways that are rights-enhancing and 
even privacy-enhancing. The ambition of this Article is to show how.
I. WARRANTS
To understand the role technology—in this case simple 
communication platforms such as FaceTime and Google Hangout—can 
play as a doctrinal assist in restoring the Fourth Amendment to its original 
meaning, it makes sense to begin with Johnson v. United States and what 
the warrant requirement used to mean. Over a half a century ago, in
Johnson v. United States,10 the Court articulated one of the strongest 
justifications for requiring a warrant:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not 
grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law 
enforcement the support of the usual inferences which 
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists 
of requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and 
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer 
                                                                                                                     
9. Id. at 21.
10. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
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engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a 
magistrate’s disinterested determination to issue a search 
warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a 
warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave 
the people’s homes secure only in the discretion of police 
officers. . . . When the right of privacy must reasonably yield 
to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial 
officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement 
agent.11
This reasoning still makes sense. Nor is this the only reason to prefer 
a warrant. Others include forcing officers to rationalize the basis for a 
search;12 avoiding hindsight bias on the part of courts;13 reducing 
unjustified searches or seizures where the evidence is in fact insufficient 
to establish probable cause,14 or where prudence militates against a 
search;15 deterring abuses of authority by despotic or capricious 
officers;16 and providing assurances to those searched that the officer has 
the legal authority to in fact engage in the search.17 And yet, the last 
several decades have witnessed an explosion of exceptions that swallow 
the supposedly “categorical”18 and “cardinal principle”19 that warrantless 
searches violate the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, the warrant requirement 
has been so watered down that Justice Antonin Scalia remarked upon it 
in his concurrence in California v. Acevedo,20 stating: “Even before 
today’s decision, the ‘warrant requirement’ had become so riddled with 
exceptions that it was basically unrecognizable. In 1985, one 
commentator catalogued nearly 20 such exceptions . . . .”21
But things do not have to be this way, especially considering that 
many of the exceptions to the warrant requirement developed out of the 
difficulty of securing a warrant quickly rather than out of a principled 
                                                                                                                     
11. Id. at 13–14 (footnotes omitted).
12. Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1609, 
1641–47 (2012).
13. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964); Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 12, at 1614.
14. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 
411 (1974).
15. Cf. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984) (noting that an offense could be so 
minor as to not justify a warrantless search, even though probable cause exists).
16. Id. at 751; see SOLOVE, supra note 2, at 127.
17. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983).
18. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
19. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978).
20. 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
21. Id. at 582 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth 
Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1473–74 (1985)).
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belief that warrants should be excused.22 Current, widely available 
technology already makes securing a warrant in minutes relatively easy.23
This technology can provide a doctrinal assist in getting us back to 
warrants. The two examples below—the automobile exception to the 
warrant requirement and the exigency exception to the warrant 
requirement—illustrate this precisely.24
A. The Automobile Exception
The automobile exception, which permits warrantless searches of 
automobiles, made complete sense when the Court created the exception 
in 1925, in Carroll v. United States.25 It makes almost no sense now. And 
much of this has to do with the facts and technology then and now.
In December 1921, federal prohibition agents were patrolling the 
highway between Detroit and Grand Rapids, a known bootlegging area 
given its proximity to Canada, when they passed the “Carroll boys” in an 
Oldsmobile roadster.26 Recognizing the Carroll boys as men they had 
tried to purchase bootleg from a few months earlier,27 the agents followed 
the men for some sixteen miles before stopping them and conducting a 
warrantless search of the vehicle.28 Behind the seats, the agents found 68 
bottles of whiskey and gin.29 Based on this evidence, which was admitted 
against the Carroll boys at trial, the two men were convicted of 
transporting intoxicating liquor.30
The problem was that their vehicle had been searched without a 
warrant, which the Court had long held to be necessary under the Fourth 
Amendment before a search could be conducted.31 The Court avoided this 
                                                                                                                     
22. To put this differently, even if one insists, as the Court has increasingly done, that the 
“touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness,” one should factor in the ease in 
securing a warrant in determining whether Government action is reasonable. Florida v. Jimeno,
500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991).
23. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1572–73 (2013).
24. These two examples are not meant to be exhaustive. One can easily imagine technology 
providing a role with respect to other judicially created exceptions to the Fourth Amendment, 
such as officers’ blanket ability to conduct warrantless felony arrests in public. See generally
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (interpreting the Fourth Amendment to permit 
warrantless arrests in public so long as an officer has probable cause to believe the suspect has 
committed or is committing a felony).
25. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
26. Id. at 135, 160.
27. The agents had first tried to purchase bootleg from the men two months earlier. Id. at 
135.
28. Id. at 136.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 162.
31. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 7.2(a)–(b) (5th ed. 2012).
6
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problem by fashioning what has come to be known as the automobile 
exception.32 Writing for a 7–2 Court, Chief Justice William Taft 
conceded that in “cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably 
practicable, it must be used,”33 but held that the warrant requirement 
could be excused where a “vehicle can be quickly moved out of the 
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.”34
Hence, the Carroll Doctrine. So long as an automobile, or for that 
matter any motorized vehicle, is readily mobile and officers have 
probable cause to believe it contains evidence of criminal activity, they 
may search it.35 Indeed, the exception itself has grown. Subsequent cases 
applying the automobile exception have made clear that officers may also 
search the personal belongings of a vehicle’s occupants, if such 
belongings are capable of concealing the object of the search.36 Officers 
may even search an unoccupied vehicle without a warrant.37
The automobile exception has grown in another way as well. A series 
of cases—Whren v. United States,38 in which the Supreme Court gave its 
imprimatur to pretextual traffic stops;39 Michigan Department of State 
Police v. Sitz,40 in which the Court greenlighted suspicionless 
checkpoints;41 and United States v. Place42 and Florida v. Harris,43 under 
which an alert by a narcotics detection dog amounts to probable cause44—
have contributed to making warrantless automobile searches a matter of
routine.45 Indeed, a particularly odd state of affairs now exists: at the same 
                                                                                                                     
32. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
33. Id. at 156.
34. Id. at 153. The Court relied in part on the founding era history of not requiring warrants 
for maritime searches. Id. at 150–51.
35. Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (citing Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153).
36. E.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 307 (1999).
37. See generally 3 LAFAVE, supra note 31, § 7.2(a)–(b) (examining the application of the 
Carroll-Chambers moving vehicle exception).
38. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
39. Id. at 817–18.
40. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
41. Id. at 455.
42. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
43. 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013).
44. Id. at 1059.
45. Much of this is traceable to the federal government, which in 1986 began training 
federal agents and local police in ways to convert routine traffic stops into car searches for drugs.
See Gary Webb, Driving While Black, ESQUIRE (Jan. 29, 2007), http://www.esquire.com/news-
politics/a1223/driving-while-black-0499/; see also David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by 
Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 296, 304 (2001) (noting that many “policing programs” have permitted “suspicionless 
stops and searches” on the theory that “the more stops and searches that are conducted . . . more 
drugs, weapons, and intelligence will be secured”). The automobile exception even makes 
7
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time officers have gained more options for conducting warrantless 
searches of vehicles, citizens increasingly use cars in ways we associate 
with privacy and intimacy.46 As one commentator put it, our cars are our
second homes.47 “Our vehicles . . . are rolling offices, living rooms, and 
eating areas.”48 And yet because of the automobile exception, these 
“rolling offices, living rooms, and eating areas” can be easily searched 
based solely on an officer’s ex post articulation that probable cause 
existed. In short, responding to one type of technology—the advent of the 
automobile49—the Court carved an exception to the warrant requirement 
that now, almost a century later, seems decidedly outmoded and counter 
to the long-standing preference for warrants.
However, technology need not be a one-way street. Just as technology 
in Carroll justified excusing the warrant requirement, technology today 
justifies reinstituting it. Put another way, rather than infringing on our 
Fourth Amendment protections and our “right to be let alone,”50
technology can be deployed to further Fourth Amendment protections by 
reinvigorating the warrant requirement. Recall that in Carroll, because 
the car was in transit, “seizure [was] impossible except without a 
warrant.”51 Recall, too, Chief Justice Taft’s language emphasizing the 
impracticality of securing a warrant for a moving vehicle and his 
admonishment that in “cases where the securing of a warrant is 
reasonably practicable, it must be used.”52 While securing a warrant for 
an automobile may have been impractical and hence unreasonable in 
                                                                                                                     
appearances in popular culture with songs such as Jay-Z’s “99 Problems.” JAY-Z, 99 Problems,
on THE BLACK ALBUM (Def Jam Records 2003).
46. This is not to suggest that the association of cars with intimacy is entirely new. It has 
been around for some time, as Professor Carol Sanger points out in her brilliant essay. See 
generally Carol Sanger, Girls and the Getaway: Cars, Culture, and the Predicament of Gendered 
Space, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 705 (1995) (discussing how the law has transformed society’s treatment 
of the automobile and the impact the transformation has had on the women demographic).
47. Tim Lott, The Car, Our Second Home, GUARDIAN (Nov. 23, 2013, 2:15 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2013/nov/23/the-car-our-second-home. 
48. David A. Harris, Car Wars: The Fourth Amendment’s Death on the Highway, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 556, 576 (1998) (“Put simply, no activity is common to more Americans than 
driving or riding in a car.”); Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 HARV.
L. REV. 835, 840 (1974) (“That the automobile is an extension of its owner’s personality is evident 
in American society.”).
49. As professor Orin Kerr has observed, scholars tend to focus on current technology when 
considering the Fourth Amendment and sidestep the fact that the Court has always had to respond 
to technological advances, such as the invention of the automobile. See Orin Kerr, An 
Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 503 (2011).
50. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
51. Carroll v. United States, 276 U.S. 132, 156 (1925).
52. Id. at 156.
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1925 when Carroll was decided, and even in 1999 when the Court last 
decided a significant automobile exception case,53 the same can hardly be 
said today, when both cars and phones are mobile, when nearly 100% of
large and mid-size police departments have some type of in-field 
computer access54 and a growing number are outfitting officers with 
tablets and smart phones,55 and when an officer on the road can reach a 
magistrate anywhere with the press of a finger. Indeed, with other 
technologies—for example, the automatic license plate reader technology 
used with surveillance cameras in many jurisdictions,56 the potential use 
of dedicated short-range communications technology by the police to 
slow down or disable vehicles,57 and the possibility of GPS tracking via 
a car’s own OnStar tracking system or the deployment of high-tech 
drones58—the likelihood of a car being able to quickly move out of the
jurisdiction—part of the original argument for the automobile 
exception59—will soon be miniscule. If the underlying rationale for the 
                                                                                                                     
53. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 307 (1999) (holding that the police may also 
search the belongings of a vehicle’s occupants under the automobile exception).
54. See BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2007, at 
23 (2010), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd07.pdf. Since 2007, departments of all sizes 
have significantly increased their use of in-field computer systems. See BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2013: EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY, 2013, at 5 
(“About 9 in 10 local police officers were employed by a department that provided in-field 
computerized access to vehicle and driving records.”).
55. See Melanie Basich, Tablets: The Handheld Option, POLICE MAG. (Nov. 15, 2012),
http://www.policemag.com/channel/technology/articles/2012/11/the-handheld-option.aspx;
Tatiana Schlossberg, New York City Police to Be Equipped with Smartphones and Tablets, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/24/nyregion/new-york-city-police-to-
be-equipped-with-smartphones-and-tablets.html; Eric Sun, Why Police & Fire Are Moving to 
Phones and Tablets, PUBLICEYE (June 23, 2014), http://www.publiceyes.com/blog/police-fire-
phones-tablets/.
56. I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Surveillance, and Communities, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 959, 
960–64 (2013) (citing locales that use the technology).
57. Such technology has already been patented. See Vehicle Slowdown Control via Short 
Range Wireless Commc’n, U.S. Patent No. 8239076 (filed Mar. 31, 2008); see also John R. 
Quain, Ford Demo of Car-to-Car Communication Shows What Happens When Cars Talk,
FOXNEWS (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2014/02/04/what-happens-when-cars-
talk-to-each-other/. 
58. Such drones are already in development. In one prototype by BMW:
[A] larger “ePatrol” vehicle is equipped with up to three individual drones that 
can be deployed to follow suspected criminals in high-speed chases across busy 
highways. Once one of the smaller can catch up with a targeted car, those 
individual drones would then be able to send an impulse to startle the driver.
Cop Cars to Be Replaced with Drones by 2025, RT: AM. (Nov. 23, 2012, 7:34 PM), 
http://www.rt.com/usa/cop-patrol-drone-la-442/.
59. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
9
Capers: Policing, Technology, and Doctrinal Assists
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
732 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
automobile exception is the impracticability of securing a warrant due to 
a car’s mobility, current technology renders that rationale 
superannuated.60
Consider just one possibility: the use of the communication platforms 
FaceTime or Google Hangout. With FaceTime, a popular App, an officer 
can make video calls over Wi-Fi from an iPhone (or iPad, iPod touch, or 
Mac computer) to a magistrate judge’s device. The officer can also make 
FaceTime calls over cellular networks on an iPhone or iPad. The Apple 
website describing FaceTime says it all: “[B]e there in person, even when 
you’re not.”61 Indeed, the officer need not even look up the number for a 
magistrate: any law enforcement agency can remotely send contact 
information for every magistrate to every officer’s phone. Other 
communications platforms like Google Hangout and Skype include even 
more functionalities. Google Hangout and its platform allow for 
communication among multiple users—a call can include the officer, a 
magistrate, and a prosecutor, for example—and allows the instantaneous 
sharing of photos and videos.62 Google Hangout would also allow the 
officer, or affiant, to immediately “see” that a magistrate is available.
Perhaps most importantly, Google Hangout can be used in conjunction 
with Google Drive, which allows documents to be jointly viewed and 
jointly edited. Lastly, it permits a recording of the conversation to be 
immediately saved onto the platform, so that it is later available for 
evidentiary purposes. And of course, FaceTime and Google Hangout are 
simply examples.63 Law enforcement agencies are already working with 
software companies to fashion technology for their needs.64 As such, one 
can easily imagine communication platforms tailored to assist techno-
policing.
Technology has other advantages over traditional paper affidavits and 
warrants. A judge can ask follow-up questions to better ascertain whether 
                                                                                                                     
60. Scholars have long argued that the automobile exception should apply only in situations 
where officers are unable to obtain a warrant. See, e.g., Arnold H. Loewy, Cops, Cars, and 
Citizens: Fixing the Broken Balance, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 535, 566 (2002).
61. Use FaceTime with Your iPhone, iPad, or iPod Touch, APPLE SUPPORT,
https://www.apple.com/ios/facetime/ (last modified May 31, 2016).
62. Hangouts, G SUITE, https://gsuite.google.com/products/hangouts/ (last visited Jan. 20, 
2017).
63. Other communication platforms include Oovoo, Adobe Acrobat Connect, Ekiga, 
WebEx, and AT&T Connect. See Nadeem Unuth, Top Video Conferencing Applications and 
Services, LIFEWIRE (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.lifewire.com/top-video-conferencing-apps-
3426687.
64. See Law Enforcement Equipment and Technology, NAT’L INST. JUST. (Mar. 28, 2014),
http://www.nij.gov/topics/law-enforcement/technology/pages/welcome.aspx (noting that the 
agency “sponsors a broad array of research and development of equipment and technology for 
police”).
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probable cause in fact exists. The judge can observe the demeanor of the 
affiant to assist her in her credibility determination. Equally important, 
the demeanor of the affiant can be preserved for discovery and review. In 
other words, with current technology, the word “automobile” need not be 
“a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and 
disappears,”65 as Justice Stewart feared.
B.  The Exigency Exception
Technology can also further Fourth Amendment protections with 
respect to the exigency exception, which “applies when ‘the exigencies 
of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that 
[a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.”66 The problem is that the exigency exception, like the 
automobile exception discussed above, is often applied in a way that has 
little to do with its rationale. Indeed, in a certain sense exigent 
circumstances can take on a talismanic quality on par with abracadabra 
or hocus-pocus: an officer need only articulate ex post some emergency, 
no matter his role in creating the emergency, to be able to search or seize 
what otherwise would have required a warrant.67
The readily available communications platforms discussed in 
connection with the automobile exception could play a similar role here. 
With the use of a platform like FaceTime or Google Hangout, an officer 
can secure a warrant almost instantaneously. Rather than basing his 
determination that an exigency exists on his own estimation alone—an 
estimation which will likely be influenced by the officer’s interest in 
conducting a search68—available technology suggests that an officer 
should be required, when feasible, to articulate the basis for the exigency 
ex ante and seek a judge’s approval.69
Indeed, a recent exigent circumstances case suggests the Court is 
beginning to recognize the potential technology has in making the 
                                                                                                                     
65. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461–62 (1971).
66. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 
394 (1978)).
67. Like every exception that bypasses the warrant requirement, the exigency exception 
suffers from the problems previously identified, including hindsight bias. See supra notes 10–11
and accompanying text. There is another problem as well: There is only a weak mechanism to 
deter officers from overestimating the exigency. If the officers over-estimate the exigency but find 
contraband, courts will likely conclude that the exigency existed in order to avoid suppression.
On the other hand, if the officers overestimate exigency but find nothing, no one will be the wiser, 
since this failure is unlikely to come to the attention of a judge. 
68. The exclusionary rule is predicated on the assumption that officers are interested actors, 
an assumption reflected in the Federal Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 803(8) advisory 
committee’s note (excluding police reports from public records exception to hearsay ban).
69. See Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 12, at 1614, 1641–47.
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warrant requirement a real requirement again. Missouri v. McNeely70
involved the warrantless drawing and testing of blood of a suspected 
intoxicated driver.71 Missouri’s argument was simple: given the natural 
metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream, there should be a blood-
testing exception allowing the warrantless drawing of blood in cases 
where there is probable cause to believe a suspect has engaged in drunk 
driving.72 And there was precedent on Missouri’s side. Decades earlier, 
in Schmerber v. California,73 the Court upheld a warrantless blood-test 
of a drunk driver where the officer reasonably believed “he was 
confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a 
warrant, under the circumstances, threatened ‘the destruction of 
evidence.’”74 The McNeely Court distinguished Schmerber, however, 
noting that what may have once been reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment in “an era when cell phones and e-mail were unknown”75
was not necessarily reasonable today given the “advances in the 47 years 
since Schmerber . . . that allow for the more expeditious processing of 
warrant applications.”76 The Court observed:
[P]olice can often request warrants rather quickly these days.
At least 30 States provide for electronic warrant 
applications. In many States, a police officer can call a judge, 
convey the necessary information, and be authorized to affix 
the judge’s signature to the warrant. Utah has an e-warrant 
procedure where a police officer enters information into a 
system, the system notifies a prosecutor, and upon approval 
the officer forwards the information to a magistrate, who can 
electronically return the warrant to the officer. Judges have 
been known to issue warrants in as little as five minutes. And
in one county in Kansas, police officers can e-mail warrant 
requests to judges’ iPads; judges have signed such warrants 
and e-mailed them back to officers in less than 15 minutes.77
Unfortunately, aside from its decision in Missouri v. McNeely, the 
Court has been slow in recognizing how this warrant-facilitating 
technology can restore the warrant requirement more broadly, especially 
since the Court has separately ruled that the Fourth Amendment permits 
officers to temporarily secure or “freeze” a location in order to allow them 
                                                                                                                     
70. 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013).
71. Id. at 1557.
72. Id. at 1568.
73. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
74. Id. at 770 (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)).
75. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1574 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
76. Id. at 1561.
77. Id. at 1572–73 (citations omitted).
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the time to apply for and obtain a warrant from a judicial officer.78 The 
Court’s slow-footedness can be seen in its recent exigency case, Kentucky 
v. King.79 King involved the paradigmatic exigency situation—the 
possible destruction of drug evidence.80 Not knowing which of two 
apartments a seller of crack cocaine had entered, officers chose the 
apartment on the left, from which the smell of marijuana was 
emanating.81 The officers banged on the door and announced their 
presence. After hearing “people inside moving” and “things . . . being 
moved inside the apartment,” the officers made a forced entry and 
conducted a warrantless search, counting on the exigency exception.82 In 
fact, it turned out the officers had entered the wrong apartment.
The Court’s description of the post-entry events is revealing:
At that point, the officers announced that they “were 
going to make entry inside the apartment.” [Officer] Cobb 
then kicked in the door, the officers entered the apartment, 
and they found three people in the front room: respondent 
Hollis King, respondent’s girlfriend, and a guest who was 
smoking marijuana. The officers performed a protective 
sweep of the apartment during which they saw marijuana 
and powder cocaine in plain view. In a subsequent search, 
they also discovered crack cocaine, cash, and drug 
paraphernalia.
Police eventually entered the apartment on the right. 
Inside, they found the suspected drug dealer who was the 
initial target of their investigation.83
King objected to the admission of evidence found in his apartment.84
Specifically, King argued that the exigency exception excusing the 
warrant requirement should not apply to situations where the police 
deliberately create the exigent circumstances (in his case by banging on 
his door) or where it should be reasonably foreseeable to police that their 
actions will lead to exigent circumstances.85 The Court, however, rejected 
these arguments, and held that the exigency exception will apply so long 
as “the police do not gain entry to premises by means of an actual or 
threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment.”86 Because the police did 
                                                                                                                     
78. See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331–33 (2001).
79. 563 U.S. 452 (2011).
80. Id. at 456.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 456–57 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
84. Id. at 457.
85. Id. at 468.
86. Id. at 469.
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not violate the Fourth Amendment by banging on King’s door, the 
exigency exception justified the police forcing entry once the officers 
heard movement that lead them to believe drug-evidence was being 
destroyed.87 While there are reasons to be critical of the Court’s ruling, 
the point raised here is slightly different and goes to the role developing 
technology can play in providing a doctrinal assist by making the warrant 
requirement, especially when it comes to the home,88 an actual 
requirement again. 
Consider again the sequence of events. Officers, hoping to arrest an 
individual who had just sold crack cocaine to an undercover officer, know 
that he is in one of two apartments. Although the Court has declined to 
reduce probable cause to mathematics, instead stating that “probable 
cause is a fluid concept”89 based on the “totality of the circumstances,”90
the general assumption is that “probable cause involves less than a 
‘50%+’ likelihood of accuracy.”91 If that is true, even before knocking on 
the apartment door, the officers could have applied to a magistrate for a 
warrant to search either or both apartments.92 Equally important, that 
magistrate could have issued a warrant, or more practically, suggested the 
officers simply surveil both apartments and arrest the target when he 
exited. Either option would be preferable to our growing practice of 
allowing officers free rein to conduct warrantless searches.
                                                                                                                     
87. Id. at 469–70.
88. The home has long enjoyed special protection under the Fourth Amendment. As the 
Court recently stated, “[W]hen it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among equals. 
At the Amendment’s ‘very core’ stands ‘the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there 
be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’” Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 
(2013) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)); see also I. Bennett Capers, 
Home Is Where the Crime Is, 109 MICH. L. REV. 979, 980 (2011) (reviewing JEANNIE SUK, AT
HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING PRIVACY 
(2009)) (discussing shifts in “how the law perceives the home”).
89. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370–71 (2003); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232
(1983).
90. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371.
91. JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 8.07[A] (5th ed. 2010) (emphasis added); see also Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371.
92. Setting this aside, there was another point at which a warrant could have been obtained.
Recall again the sequence. The officers, after hearing what sounded as if the occupants might be 
attempting to destroy evidence, forced entry and found three occupants in the front room. The 
officers then conducted a protective search to ensure their own safety, during which they observed 
some marijuana and powder cocaine in plain view. All of this is currently permitted by a strong 
exigency exception and weak warrant rule. But consider the next sentence: “In a subsequent 
search, they also discovered crack cocaine, cash, and drug paraphernalia.” Kentucky v. King, 563 
U.S. 452, 457 (2011). Clearly, with the three occupants in custody, any exigency that may have 
existed had come to an end. Put differently, the “subsequent search” could not possibly be justified 
by the exigency exception, especially since the Court has given officers the ability to secure a 
location until a warrant is obtained. See id.
14
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To be clear, this Article is not suggesting that available technology 
will eliminate exigent circumstances in every case. For example, it is hard 
to imagine technology reducing the exigent circumstances exception that 
would allow officers to intervene in a crime in progress.93 But it does 
suggest that the possibility of quickly securing a warrant by recourse to 
available technology should play a role in determining the 
constitutionality of any search.94
This Section ends by turning to another technology case, Riley v. 
California,95 the Court’s recent decision barring the automatic search of 
iPhones found on arrestees.96 Though decided under another Fourth 
Amendment exception—the search incident to arrest exception—the case 
is pertinent to the discussion of exigency for two reasons. One, the search 
incident to arrest exception is, to a certain extent, a specialized 
application of the broader exigency exception that allows a warrantless 
search.97 The thinking is that an arrestee may be automatically and 
immediately searched in order to prevent the arrestee from destroying 
evidence on his person or grabbing a weapon to use against the officers.98
Two, the specific issue of exigency repeatedly surfaced in Riley. The 
State of California, supported by other government amici, raised the 
specter that permitting officers to search iPhones was necessary because 
of the risk that a cohort of the defendant could, within seconds, remotely 
delete the data.99 But even here, the Court recognized that technology, 
though adding a wrinkle to the search incident to arrest doctrine,100 also 
                                                                                                                     
93. For example, exigent circumstances may still exist in situations where police are 
summoned to intervene in an ongoing domestic violence crime.
94. This was precisely the problem in Mincey v. Arizona, in which a suspect shot an 
undercover officer who was trying to make a purchase of narcotics in the suspect’s home. 437 
U.S. 385, 387 (1978). The officers were entitled to conduct a warrantless entry into the home to 
provide medical assistance. Id. at 392–93. They were also entitled to sweep the premises in order 
to secure their own safety. Id. The officers were not entitled, absent a warrant, to continue 
searching the premises after the exigency had ended. Id.; see also Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 
U.S. 11, 14 (1999) (ruling that search of suspect’s home, following an emergency, was not 
justified by exigency exception and that items found during the search must be suppressed). 
95. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
96. Id. at 2485.
97. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 91, § 12.01.
98. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). Indeed, it is precisely because of this 
assumed exigency that the search incident to arrest exception has its own time limitation. The 
search must in fact occur incident to the arrest in order to fall within the exception. A search 
conducted later in time—for example, several hours after an arrest—normally does not fall under 
the search incident to arrest exception. See Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 365, 367–68
(1964).
99. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2486–87.
100. Id. at 2495. The Court essentially created an exception to an exception. Although the 
search incident to arrest exception allows officers to fully search an arrestee and use any evidence 
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adds a solution that furthers Fourth Amendment goals. The Court
essentially noted that technology can be a doctrinal assist.101 As the Riley
Court put it, “Recent technological advances . . . [make] the process of 
obtaining a warrant more efficient.”102 In short, obtaining a warrant is 
easier, and quicker, and thus can minimize any claimed exigency.103
Again, the task is to apply that reasoning across the board.
II. TRANSPARENCY
Techno-policing can also function as a doctrinal assist with respect to 
another goal: transparency in policing, which is critical to accountability 
and democratic policing104 and one of the keystones of the President’s
Task Force on 21st Century Policing.105 The calls for officers to wear 
body cameras are by now well-known.106 There is also growing interest 
in copwatching. What has remained under the radar is the role another 
technology, public surveillance cameras, can play in increasing 
transparency and enhancing citizens’ rights. To be sure, public 
surveillance cameras can capture and make visible police use of excessive 
force. But far more broadly, public surveillance cameras can play a 
significant role in remedying some of the juridical gaps left by the Court’s
Fourth Amendment decisions governing so-called “consensual 
encounters” and Terry stop-and-frisks. 
                                                                                                                     
found, the Court ruled that the exception will not apply to electronic devices capable of storing 
large amounts of data. See id.
101. Id. at 2494–95.
102. Id. at 2493.
103. Id. at 2487. Indeed, the Court invoked technology in another respect. In response to the 
argument from California and amici that the exigency exception should apply because of the risk 
of remote data wiping, the Court noted that “Faraday bags”—cheap, lightweight bags made of 
aluminum foil—could be used to isolate the phone from radio waves and remote wiping. Id. In 
short, the Court concluded that the existence of technology such as Faraday bags can mitigate 
exigency. Id.
104. There is a rich literature on transparency in policing and its importance to democratic 
policing. Three important articles are: Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic 
Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1848–49 (2015) (arguing that transparency “is critical to 
accountability” and democratic policing); Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV.
1107, 1120 (2000) (arguing for “systematic visibility of policing decisions and concomitant 
justifications” as a means of making law enforcement more democratic and trustworthy);
Simonson, supra note 6 (championing copwatching as a tactic for making police actions more 
transparent and contributing to democratic policing).
105. See PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE 
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 12 (2015),
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf.
106. For an early call for the police use of body cameras, see David A. Harris, Picture This: 
Body-Worn Video Devices (Head Cams) as Tools for Ensuring Fourth Amendment Compliance 
by Police, 43 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 357, 359–60 (2010).
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A different technology, digital audio recorders, provides another 
doctrinal assist. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,107 the Court read the 
Fourth Amendment as permitting searches and seizures based on consent 
alone, so long as the consent itself is voluntary.108 Importantly, the Court 
rejected any requirement that the person “consenting” be advised of her 
right to refuse consent.109 But while the “voluntariness” standard may 
seem easy to articulate, it has proved difficult to apply with integrity for 
a host of reasons. Here again simple technology—simple digital 
recordings—can play a crucial role in assisting courts in determining the 
validity of, and leveling the playing field with respect to, consent.
And of course, insofar as both technologies—public surveillance 
cameras and digital audio recorders—aid in transparency, they serve 
another purpose as well: they can significantly increase perceptions of
legitimacy.
A. Public Surveillance Cameras, Encounters, and Stop-and-Frisks
Perhaps more than any other technology, public surveillance cameras 
can make visible, and hence reviewable, every day police interactions 
with citizens. In particular, such cameras can play a crucial role in 
enhancing the rights of citizens by filling gaps in current Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. After all, the Court has held that citizen–
police interactions, at least where a reasonable citizen would feel free to 
terminate the encounter, are “consensual encounters” and thus outside of 
the protection of the Fourth Amendment.110 The Court has also held that, 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment, police can forcibly stop and frisk 
someone so long as the officer has articulable suspicion of criminal 
activity.111 But the line between a consensual encounter and a Terry stop 
is notoriously blurry, so much so that the Court itself is often unable to 
agree if and when the line has been crossed.112 To further complicate 
matters, whether a hypothetical reasonable person would in fact have felt 
free to terminate the encounter or whether the officer in fact had 
reasonable, articulable suspicion both involve standards that can be (and 
have been) manipulated and articulated after the fact. Lastly, since there 
are rarely witnesses other than the civilian and the police, court 
determinations about the propriety of a stop or frisk almost always turn 
on the testimony of the officer. Not only does this standard tip the scales 
                                                                                                                     
107. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
108. Id. at 228.
109. Id. at 228–35 (holding that knowledge of right to refuse consent is unnecessary).
110. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984);
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
111. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
112. See, e.g., Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 552–58 (1980).
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against citizens, it does so in the face of widespread evidence that officers 
engage in “testilying.”113 In short, public surveillance cameras can do 
much of the work in presenting a record, ex post, of whether officers were 
justified in their actions, ex ante.
To show the work public surveillance cameras can do, it makes sense 
to begin with the work cameras are already doing. Although rarely 
noticed or remarked upon, public surveillance cameras are already 
integral to law enforcement.114 For example, New York City aggregates 
and analyzes data from approximately 3,000 surveillance cameras around 
the city and allows the police to scan license plates, cross-check criminal 
databases, measure radiation levels, “and more.”115 Washington, D.C., is 
in the process of consolidating over 5,000 cameras into one network 
called the Video Interoperability for Public Safety.116 Chicago, with at 
least 2,250 surveillance cameras, has Operation Virtual Shield, which 
includes biometric technology.117 Baltimore has CitiWatch, which 
includes over 400 cameras equipped with low light, pan, tilt, and zoom 
capabilities.118 Even small towns have turned to surveillance cameras. A
survey from just under a decade ago listed over two hundred towns in 
thirty-seven states that were either using or planning to use public 
surveillance cameras.119
                                                                                                                     
113. See COMM’N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-
CORRUPTION PROC. OF THE POLICE DEP’T, CITY OF N.Y., COMMISSION REPORT 36 (1994).
“Testilying” is a term coined to describe police perjury and other false statements. See Joe Sexton, 
New York Police Often Lie Under Oath, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 1994),
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/04/22/us/new-york-police-often-lie-under-oath-report-says.html?
pagewanted=all&mcubz=3; see generally I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying,
83 IND. L.J. 835 (2008). For a discussion of the prevalence of testilying, see infra notes 133–37
and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., Steve Henn, In More Cities, a Camera on Every Corner, Park, and Sidewalk,
NPR (June 20, 2013, 2:57 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2013/06/
20/191603369/The-Business-Of-Surveillance-Cameras.
115. Joe Coscarelli, The NYPD’s Domain Awareness System Is Watching You, N.Y. MAG.
(Aug. 9, 2012, 8:50 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2012/08/nypd-domain-
awareness-system-microsoft-is-watching-you.html; accord Rocco Parascandola & Tina Moore, 
NYPD Unveils New $40 Million Super Computer System That Uses Data from Network of 
Cameras, License Plate Readers and Crime Reports, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 8, 2012, 8:50 PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nypd-unveils-new-40-million-super-computer-system-
data-network-cameras-license-plate-readers-crime-reports-article-1.1132135.
116. D.C. Police Set to Monitor 5,000 Cameras, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2008),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/apr/9/dc-police-set-to-monitor-5000-cameras/.
117. BILGE YESIL, VIDEO SURVEILLANCE: POWER AND PRIVACY IN EVERYDAY LIFE 38 (2009).
118. Id. at 35.
119. Lisa Hoffman, Under Surveillance: Government Spy Cameras Proliferate,
PRISONPLANET (June 23, 2006), http://www.prisonplanet.com/articles/june2006/230606
Surveillance.htm; Charlie Savage, US Doles Out Millions for Street Cameras, BOS. GLOBE
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And the technology is quite advanced. Consider Hawkeye II.
Hawkeye II uses aerial cameras with a total resolution of 192 mexapixels 
to provide continuous coverage of entire cities.120 Perhaps more 
important, with the click of a button, it has the ability to zoom in after the 
fact and then scroll backwards and forward in time.121 Consider how it 
has been used in just one city, Dayton, Ohio.122 On a June day in Dayton, 
police received reports of an attempted robbery at a bookstore and of 
shots fired at a sandwich shop.123 A surveillance team turned to Hawkeye 
II cameras hovering two miles above the city.124 Using the time of the 
calls, the team was able to zoom in on the locations and study them frame 
by frame to piece together a narrative.125 The analysis of the Hawkeye II 
camera surveillance, with its rewind and fast forward capability, allowed 
the team to track the movements of a man from the bookstore following 
the attempted robbery, to the sandwich shop, to a Family Dollar store, to 
a gas station, to his home.126 As the Washington Post put it, police “used 
the detailed map of the man’s movements, along with other evidence 
from the crime scenes, to arrest him for all three crimes.”127
The point here is not to weigh in on whether, with the proliferation of 
cameras, we have lost some privacy. The answer is likely yes, though it 
is a loss that sometimes escapes notice. Nor is the point to lament how 
Fourth Amendment doctrine—with its insistence that there can be no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in public spaces128—has both enabled 
and facilitated the proliferation of surveillance cameras. Rather, the point 
is more radical: At the same time that cameras reduce some privacy, such 
                                                                                                                     
(Aug. 12, 2007), http://archive.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2007/08/12/us_
doles_out_millions_for_street_cameras/.
120. Radiolab, Eye in the Sky, NPR (June 18, 2015), http://www.radiolab.org/story/eye-sky/; 
Craig Timberg, New Surveillance Technology Can Track Everyone in an Area for Several Hours 
at a Time, WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/
new-surveillance-technology-can-track-everyone-in-an-area-for-several-hours-at-a-time/2014/
02/05/82f1556e-876f-11e3-a5bd-844629433ba3_story.html.
121. Timberg, supra note 120.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (holding that the use of a 
tracking device to monitor a vehicle did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, 
since there could be no reasonable expectation of privacy on public thoroughfares). Of course, in 
the relatively recent case United States v. Jones, the Court left open the possibility that some
surveillance in public could be so extensive that it might rise to the level of an unreasonable search 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 565 U.S. 400, 430–31 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in 
judgment).
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cameras (at least those installed and monitored with public input and 
control) can also be rights-enhancing insofar as they provide 
transparency, particularly with respect to police–citizen interactions.
Consider a hypothetical interaction between an officer and a young 
woman.129 The woman has just disembarked from a flight from Los 
Angeles to Detroit and is walking through the concourse when two Drug 
Enforcement Administration agents notice her. The agents decide to 
approach her because they believe she fits a “drug courier profile,”
though in theory their criteria would include almost any passenger. As 
Justice Thurgood Marshall demonstrated with his string cite of cases in 
which a traveler matched one of the DEA’s profiles, the net such profiles 
can cast is wide indeed:
Compare, e.g., United States v. Moore, 675 F.2d 802, 803 
(CA6 1982) (suspect was first to deplane), cert. denied 460 
U.S. 1068 (1983), with United States v. Mendenhall, 446 
U.S. 544, 564 (1980) (last to deplane), with United States v. 
Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29, 31 (CA2 1980) (deplaned 
from middle); United States v. Sullivan, 625 F.2d 9, 12 (CA4 
1980) (one-way tickets), with United States v. Craemer, 555 
F.2d 594, 595 (CA6 1977) (round-trip tickets), with United
States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717, 720 (CA6 1977) (nonstop 
flight), with United States v. Sokolow, 808 F.2d 1366, 1370 
(CA9), vacated, 831 F.2d 1413 (1987) (case below)
(changed planes); Craemer, supra, at 595 (no luggage), with 
United States v. Sanford, 658 F.2d 342, 343 (CA5 1981) 
(gym bag), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 991 (1982), with Sullivan,
supra, at 12 (new suitcases); United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 
882, 883 (CA6 1978) (traveling alone), with United States v. 
Fry, 622 F.2d 1218, 1219 (CA5 1980) (traveling with 
companion); United States v. Andrews, 600 F.3d 563, 566 
(CA6 1979) (acted nervously), cert. denied sub nom. Brooks 
v. United States, 444 U.S. 878 (1979), with United States v. 
                                                                                                                     
129. The hypothetical is loosely based on United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
But it is also informed by a long-standing practice of targeting women of color for surveillance 
and intrusive searches at airports, especially women of color traveling internationally. See, e.g.,
Sherri Sharma, Beyond “Driving While Black” and “Flying While Brown”: Using 
Intersectionality to Uncover the Gendered Aspects of Racial Profiling, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER &
L. 275, 276 (2003). The particular suspicion black women have faced while flying is well 
documented. A report released by the U.S. General Accounting Office found that black women 
traveling internationally were nine times more likely than white women to be subjected to x-rays 
or strip searches by U.S. Customs officials, even though they were less than half as likely to be 
carrying contraband. Such targeting prompted a class action suit against officials. See John 
Gibeaut, Marked for Humiliation, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1999, at 46, 46; Associated Press, Black Women 
Searched More, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2000, at A17.
20
Florida Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol69/iss3/2
2017] POLICING, TECHNOLOGY, AND DOCTRINAL ASSISTS 743
Himmelwright, 551 F.2d 991, 992 (CA5) (acted too calmly),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977).130
The officers identify themselves as federal agents, ask to see her 
identification, and ask her about the purpose of her trip. Believing the 
woman to be “extremely nervous,” the agents ask the woman to 
accompany them to an office for further questioning, where they then ask 
for permission to search her person and her handbag. Later, humiliated, 
the young woman claims that her Fourth Amendment rights were 
violated.
Already, the determination of whether the woman was “free to leave”
(meaning there was no seizure within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment) or whether she was at some point detained (which would 
mean there was an unconstitutional seizure absent probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion), is already a difficult call. The difficulty will likely 
be compounded by testimonial inconsistencies. For example, the woman 
may testify that the only real profile she fit was her race—the actual case, 
after all, describes her as “a female and a Negro.”131 She may testify that 
nothing about her movements was suspicious, that the officers seized her 
ticket and did not return it, and that they roughly grabbed her elbow as 
they “asked” her to accompany them to their office. The agents, sincerely 
or not, may testify that they did not grab her elbow, that she looked 
around evasively as they put questions to her, and that they in fact 
returned her ticket before asking her to accompany them. There will 
likely be no other witness.
Now add public surveillance cameras. Cameras, for example, might 
confirm that there was nothing about the woman’s outward behavior to 
suggest that she was “extremely nervous” or confirm that the officers in 
fact roughly grabbed her elbow, amounting to a seizure for Fourth 
Amendment purposes. Or, alternatively, the surveillance footage might 
support the version of events presented by the DEA agents. The point is, 
either way, cameras can make citizen–police encounters transparent and 
reviewable. Certainly, video footage from public cameras could do some 
of the work of resolving inconsistencies and determining whether there 
was a Fourth Amendment violation. In fact, in some places a combination 
of public and private cameras is already doing precisely this. In New 
York City, for example, the Civilian Complaint Review Board has been 
able to substantiate a much higher rate of complaints about police 
                                                                                                                     
130. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
131. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 558.
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conduct, including unlawful stops, for one reason and one reason alone: 
cameras.132
To be sure, public surveillance cameras are not perfect, but they do 
provide a more neutral, and real-time, documentation. They can render 
visible police–citizen interactions that are too often invisible, since very 
few interactions result in the seizure of contraband or in an arrest to 
trigger judicial oversight.133 If done properly with public input and 
control, they may even deter officers from committing Fourth 
Amendment violations.134 Equally important, public surveillance 
cameras can educate judges about how the Fourth Amendment is really 
being applied and counter myopic perspectives that already tip the scales 
in favor of the police. This last point cannot be overstated, since such an 
education has the potential to “help change constitutional meaning.”135
This Article will have much more to say about public surveillance 
cameras and stop-and-frisks when it turns to the topic of accuracy in Part 
III. But hopefully the main point is already clear: public surveillance 
cameras can be rights-enhancing, and in this respect they provide a much-
needed doctrinal assist.
B. Digital Audio Recorders and Consent
Technology can also address another recurring Fourth Amendment 
problem: determining the validity of consent and leveling the playing 
field with respect to consent. This is no insignificant matter. Since the 
Court decided Schneckloth v. Bustamonte and held that the probable 
cause requirement will be excused so long as there is voluntary consent, 
consent searches have become the preferred method of law enforcement 
officers in many jurisdictions.136 Indeed, by at least one estimate, consent 
searches comprise more than 90% of all warrantless searches.137
However, as a matter of doctrine, the consent exception to the Fourth 
Amendment has never been satisfactory. A search will not violate the 
                                                                                                                     
132. N.Y.C. CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BD., SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT: JANUARY - JUNE 
2015, at 2 (2015), http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/ccrb/downloads/pdf/policy_pdf/annual_bi-
annual/2015_semi-annual.pdf.
133. See infra notes 176–208 and accompanying text.
134. Simonson, supra note 6, at 413 (“Copwatching deters police misconduct in real time.”).
135. Id. at 425.
136. Janet Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 
SUP. CT. REV. 153, 208–09; see also Alafair S. Burke, Consent Searches and Fourth Amendment 
Reasonableness, 67 FLA. L. REV. 509, 511 (2015) (noting that consent searches “permeate real-
world policing”); Brian R. Gallini, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: History’s Unspoken Fourth 
Amendment Anomaly, 79 TENN. L. REV. 233, 279–80 (2012) (recognizing the “popularity of 
consent searches”).
137. Burke, supra note 136, at 511 (citing JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES 317–18 (4th ed. 2010)).
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Fourth Amendment so long as consent was voluntarily given, but 
determining voluntariness is far from straightforward. The matter is 
further complicated by the Court’s insistence, also in Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, that the police need not advise a civilian that she may refuse.
As such, consent determinations tend to turn on a court weighing the 
testimony of police officers against the testimony of a civilian. There are 
rarely third-party witnesses. With the matter so framed, consent 
determinations are invariably tipped against citizens. Four reasons why 
this is so—the Rashomon effect, psychological pressures, murkiness, and 
“testilying”—are discussed below.
The Rashomon Effect. The first problem is the Rashomon effect.138 It 
is not necessarily the case that any witness is deliberately lying. It is rather 
that each witness remembers events from her own perspective.139 The 
Rashomon effect thus calls into question the possibility, when dealing 
with memory, of determining a univocal truth. The Rashomon effect has 
particular import in the typical hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, 
where a civilian may remember the officer as demanding consent, and the 
officer may remember requesting consent. Rather than positing that either 
the officer or the civilian is lying, the Rashomon effect suggests that both 
the officer and the civilian may remember the event through their own 
perspective, informed by their biases and their self-interests.140
Psychological Pressures. There are also psychological pressures that 
come into play during police–citizen encounters and complicate the 
determination of voluntariness. Because many of these pressures have 
been documented elsewhere,141 this Article focuses here on just one: that 
consent, rather than being purely voluntary, is often instead acquiescence 
to authority. Simply put, individuals confronted by authority figures are 
less likely to feel free to deny a request.142
                                                                                                                     
138. The term comes from director Akira Kurosawa’s 1950 film Rashomon, which opens at 
the trial of a bandit accused of murder. In flashback, the viewer “sees” the testimony of four 
witnesses, including the defendant himself. But the testimony of the witnesses, although similar 
in basics, is widely contradictory in many respects, and the viewer slowly realizes that each 
witness is remembering events from his perspective, in a way that reflects his biases, and that 
allows the witness to appear respectable to the fact finders.
139. Robert Anderson, What Is the Rashomon Effect?, in RASHOMON EFFECTS: KUROSAWA,
RASHOMON AND THEIR LEGACIES 66, 66 (Blair Davis et al. eds., 2016).
140. By way of illustration, imagine the officer in fact said, “Pop open your trunk for me?” 
At the suppression hearing, the officer may honestly recall his question as “Do you mind if I have 
a look in your trunk?” The driver, by contrast, may honestly remember the words as a command, 
“Pop open your trunk!” The Rashomon effect also explains how witnesses might differently 
interpret subsequent events. For example, if the driver responded by opening his trunk, the officer 
may honestly recall this as the driver saying “Okay,” and then opening his trunk. By contrast, the 
driver may recall his opening the trunk as simply his acquiescing to a command.
141. E.g., Nadler, supra note 136, at 165–97.
142. Id. at 173.
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Consider the role such pressures can play in a typical traffic stop. A
uniformed officer approaches a vehicle to ask for the driver’s license and 
registration. However, even before speaking the officer has already 
demonstrated his authority and power; after all, by simply turning on his 
siren he has forced the driver to pull over and delay her trip.143 This power 
is further reflected in the officer’s uniform (designed to convey military 
authority) and other indicia of power (the glistening badge, the billy club, 
the holstered gun).144 This power may also be reflected in the respective 
physical positions of the officer and the driver. He is standing, leaning 
down; she is sitting, looking up.145 Power may also be communicated in 
the officer’s tone of voice.146 And lastly, this power is reflected in his first 
“request”: his request to see the driver’s license and registration. Since 
the driver likely knows she has no right to refuse to produce her 
documentation, the driver is likely to also assume that any future 
“requests”—such as a request to search her vehicle—are not really 
requests either.147 Again, psychological experiments suggest that the 
driver may comply involuntarily.148 Surveys of actual drivers suggest the 
same. For example, in one study of randomly sampled drivers who had 
                                                                                                                     
143. Of course, other factors may influence how this power is weighted. For example, 
sociologist Annette Lareau’s research suggests that upper-middle class individuals are socialized 
to interact with authorities as equals; working class children, by contrast, are taught to defer to 
authorities. See Annette Lareau, Invisible Inequality: Social Class and Childrearing in Black 
Families and White Families, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 747, 749 (2002).
144. See Richard R. Johnson, An Examination of Police Department Uniform and Color and 
Police–Citizen Aggression, 40 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 228, 229 (2013); Richard R. Johnson, The 
Psychological Influence of the Police Uniform, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Mar. 2001, at 27, 27
(discussing how the uniform of the police officer “conveys power and authority”).
145. Placing oneself in a physical position of dominance is a hallmark policing strategy 
during police–citizen encounters. See, e.g., PETER B. AINSWORTH, PSYCHOLOGY AND POLICING 13 
(2002); cf. FRED. E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 193 (5th ed.
2013); Douglass Starr, The Interview, NEW YORKER (Dec. 9, 2013), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/12/09/the-interview-7 (“You remain standing to 
establish your dominance.”).
146. On the role of tone of voice generally, see Ric Simmons, Not “Voluntary” but Still 
Reasonable: A New Paradigm for Understanding the Consent Search Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 773, 
804–06 (2005).
147. Indeed, exactly what officers can “request” during police–citizen encounters is 
unsettled. As Professor Rachel Harmon recently noted:
Both state and constitutional law say a lot about when police may use some kinds 
of coercive measures, namely, stops and arrests, but much less about the scope 
of the police power to issue other commands. As a result, we cannot easily know 
the terms of interactions that could result in force.
Rachel Harmon, Lawful Orders and Police Uses of Force 15 (Oct. 20, 2016) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author).
148. Nadler, supra note 136, at 201–03.
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been “asked” for consent to search, 49 of the 54 respondents granted 
consent, but of these 49, only two considered their consent truly 
voluntary.149 A full 47 said they consented because they were afraid of 
what would happen to them if they did not consent.150 Indeed, police are 
trained in how to induce drivers to give consent. One well-known training 
manual, Tactics for Criminal Patrol, advises officers how to “position”
the driver “emotionally to grant you his permission.”151 The manual 
further suggests how requests for consent should be phrased, suggesting 
phrasing that “employs psychology in your favor. The implication is that 
the subject will look guilty if he does mind. . . . It’s psychologically harder 
to decline . . . .”152 One final point: individuals overestimate their ability 
to say no. When asked, individuals predict that if they were placed in such 
a context, they would not feel pressured to say yes. Studies prove the 
opposite.153
Murkiness. Then there is the murkiness—or indeterminacy, if you 
will—of language itself. Imagine a traffic stop in which, after inspecting 
the driver’s license and registration documents, the officer says, “Can you 
pop open your trunk for me?” Or says, “I’m going to need to look into 
your trunk for a second.” Are these requests for consent to search, or are 
they not? Analyzing such statements relying on a simple binary—it is 
either a request for consent or it is not—elides the nuances in language, 
to say nothing of tone and delivery.154 Nor is this the only murkiness 
problem, since what invariably follows these utterances (the words of the 
officer, the responsive words of the driver) is a sequence of 
                                                                                                                     
149. Id. at 202–03 (citing Illya D. Lichtenberg, Voluntary Consent or Obedience to 
Authority: An Inquiry into the “Consensual” Police-Citizen Encounter (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with author)).
150. Id. at 202.
151. CHARLES REMSBERG, TACTICS FOR CRIMINAL PATROL: VEHICLE STOPS, DRUG 
DISCOVERY AND OFFICER SURVIVAL 212–31 (1995).
152. Id. at 216.
153. See, e.g., David K. Kessler, Free to Leave? An Empirical Look at the Fourth 
Amendment’s Seizure Standard, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 51, 87 (2008). Indeed, that almost 
everyone consents undermines the notion that consents are truly voluntary. For example, one 
study found that of 16,228 drivers who were asked for consent to search, all but 3 granted consent. 
L.A. POLICE DEP’T, ARREST, DISCIPLINE, USE OF FORCE, FIELD DATA CAPTURE AND AUDIT 
STATISTICS AND THE CITY STATUS REPORT COVERING PERIOD OF JANUARY 1, 2006 – JUNE 30, 2006,
at 8, 10 (2006), http://www.lapdonline.org/home/pdf_view/33233. The percentage of pedestrians 
granting consent to search was similarly high: 99.9%. Id.
154. As professor Richard Uviller observed based on his year imbedded with police officers, 
a police officer’s request, no matter how “gently phrased, is likely to be taken by even the toughest 
citizen as a command.” H. RICHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL: A COLUMBIA LAW PROFESSOR’S
YEAR ON THE STREETS WITH THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE 81 (1988).
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translations.155 At some point later in time (especially if there is a search 
resulting in the seizure of contraband), the officer will document the 
exchange in a police report or arrest complaint. At some later point still, 
a prosecutor may prepare the officer to testify at a suppression hearing.
Still later, the prosecutor may prepare the officer to testify at trial. At each 
of these junctures, the actual exchange that occurred at point one will 
likely be translated, modified, made testimony-worthy, in part because 
we rarely remember exchanges word for word and in part because the 
police objective that existed when the first words were uttered (to search 
the trunk) have now shifted (to prove voluntariness and insure the 
admissibility of the evidence).156
Testilying. Lastly, more extreme than the murkiness problem is the 
phenomenon of officers simply lying about whether they requested (as 
oppose to demanded) consent, or about whether consent was granted.
Officers telling “white lies”—or perhaps more accurately, “blue lies”—
is disturbingly common.157 Judge Alex Kozinski of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit calls it “an open secret long shared by 
prosecutors, defense lawyers and judges that perjury is widespread 
among law enforcement officers.”158 Even surveyed officers agree that 
blue lies are widespread.159 This suggests that some officers simply lie 
about the circumstances surrounding the issue of consent. Since typically 
the only witnesses are the officer and the civilian,160 such officers also 
know that there is little chance judicial officers will discover the falsity 
of their statements. They likely also know that courts are loath to find 
police perjury.161
All of these problems—the Rashomon effect, psychological pressures, 
murkiness, and “testilying”—tip the scales against citizens. As a result of 
the Rashomon effect and murkiness, for example, courts are more likely 
to hear contradictory narratives. Faced with the choice of crediting a 
                                                                                                                     
155. Few individuals have the ability to remember conversations word for word, as numerous 
studies demonstrate. See, e.g., William Hirst & Gerald Echterhoff, Remembering in 
Conversations: The Social Sharing and Reshaping of Memories, 63 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 55, 74
(2012).
156. I saw this repeatedly when I was a federal prosecutor. It was not uncommon for “I’m 
going to need to look in your trunk” to metamorphose by the time of the suppression hearing into 
“I then requested the driver’s permission to search the trunk of his vehicle.”
157. Capers, supra note 113, at 870.
158. Stuart Taylor, Jr., For the Record, AM. LAW., Oct. 1995, at 71.
159. Myron W. Orfield, Jr., The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of 
Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016, 1050–51, 1050 n.129 (1987).
160. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
INVESTIGATIVE CASES AND COMMENTARY 482 (8th ed. 2007).
161. Capers, supra note 113, at 875.
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civilian or an officer, courts are primed to credit the latter.162 None of this 
truly gets at voluntariness. There is a reason why Professor Wayne 
LaFave, in his widely used treatise of the Fourth Amendment, begins his 
discussion of this exception with the line, “The so-called consent 
search,”163 and why Professor Janice Nadler describes it as the “fiction of 
consent.”164 If the validity of consent is predicated on the voluntariness 
of the consent granted, then the multiple difficulties in ascertaining 
voluntariness “pose [a] challenge[] to the boundaries of the Fourth 
Amendment.”165
Technology, by making consent more transparent, can minimize these 
problems. For example, every iPhone comes preinstalled with an App 
called Voice Memos, and other smartphones are equipped with similar 
technology. With a mere press of a finger, the phone will begin an audio 
recording that can be preserved indefinitely for future use. The recording 
can even be disseminated, exported via email, iMessage, or MMS. In 
other words, with existing technology, any officer can make an audio 
recording of his request for consent, and receipt of consent, to preserve 
“for the record.” In making consent transparent,166 such technology can 
provide a doctrinal assist by reducing many of the issues that make 
determining consent so troubling. The Rashomon Effect, in which 
individuals who experience the same event remember it differently, 
would perforce be minimized: a recording would now exist that captured 
the exchange in real time as it actually happened, not as the participants, 
given their own interest and biases, remember it. The same would be true 
with respect to the problem of psychological pressures, and the murkiness 
of language being translated and made “testimony-worthy.” After all, 
some of psychological pressure and murkiness that escape review during 
suppression hearings is traceable to tone. Reviewing judges would not
only have at their disposal the actual words used (addressing the 
murkiness problem) but also the tone (addressing the psychological 
pressures problem).167 And of course, “testilying” would become that 
                                                                                                                     
162. Peter Keane, Why Cops Lie, SFGATE (Mar. 15, 2011, 4:00 AM), 
http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/openforum/article/Why-cops-lie-2388737.php.
163. 3 LAFAVE, supra note 31, § 8.1.
164. Nadler, supra note 136, at 156.
165. Id. at 153.
166. Many police departments already use written “Consent to Search” forms as persuasive 
evidence that consent was voluntarily obtained. See Nancy Leong & Kira Suyeishi, Consent 
Forms and Consent Formalism, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 751, 769. However, such forms do little to 
address the problems of psychological pressures or tone. Id. at 751. As such, digital recordings 
would be a marked improvement. Id. at 752.
167. To illustrate by returning to an earlier example, a judge would have not only the 
defendant’s assertion that no consent was sought or granted, and the officer’s assertion to the 
contrary, but the actual language and tone. “Pop open the trunk for me?” may constitute a request 
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much more difficult, since an officer falsely claiming to have secured 
consent would be contradicted by, quite literally, the record.168
These are only some of the salutary benefits. Consider again the fact 
that of the surveyed drivers who granted consent, only two of them 
believed their consent was truly voluntary, and the overwhelming 
majority consented because they were afraid of what would happen if 
they did not consent.169 It stands to reason that this concern would be 
lessened, and perhaps even eliminated, if citizens knew their exchanges 
were being recorded, and that an unbiased witness (the recording) would 
be available to “speak the truth.”
C. Legitimacy
There is another important consideration. Both of the technologies 
discussed in this part—public surveillance cameras and digital audio 
recorders—can increase perceptions of legitimacy. As Professor Tom 
Tyler has repeatedly demonstrated, perceptions of legitimacy play a 
significant role in inducing compliance with the law.170 The use of public 
surveillance cameras and digital audio recorders, to the extent they render 
transparent police–citizen encounters and contribute to judicial 
reviewability, can only increase perceptions of legitimacy. And as I have 
detailed elsewhere, the benefits of increased legitimacy are manifold.171
Among other things, individuals will be more likely to voluntarily assist 
the police in maintaining an ordered society.172
III. ACCURACY
The technologies discussed so far—smartphone communication 
platforms such as FaceTime and Google Hangout, public surveillance 
                                                                                                                     
or might not, depending on the tone. The important thing is that judges, and the litigants 
themselves, will have that information.
168. An example of how such evidence can expose testilying occurred recently in Chicago, 
where a video recording played during a suppression hearing directly contradicted the testimony 
of five officers about the circumstances of a drug arrest. Martha Neil, Rare ‘Perry Mason’ Moment 
in Court Wins Dismissal for Defendant, Desk Duty for 5 Police Officers, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 15, 2014,
6:20 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/rare_perry_mason_moment_at_trial_wins_
acquittal_for_defendant_desk_duty_for.
169. See Nadler, supra note 136, at 202–03.
170. See TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC 
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 106 (2002); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE 
LAW 60 (1990).
171. See Capers, supra note 113, at 838–42.
172. Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the 
Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 252 (2008). Legitimacy 
can also stem mini-rebellions. See Capers, supra note 113, at 862–64; cf. JAMES C. SCOTT,
WEAPONS OF THE WEAK: EVERYDAY FORMS OF PEASANT RESISTANCE 322 (1985).
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cameras, and digital recorders like Voice Memo—are relatively simple 
and widely available. Moreover, adapting their use to policing in ways 
that revitalize the warrant requirement and further transparency should be 
noncontroversial. This Part turns to more cutting edge and controversial 
technologies—terahertz scanners, facial recognition software, Big Data, 
and Automated Suspicion Algorithms—and argues that these 
technologies can further another goal that we should embrace: accuracy.
To be sure, this argument is likely to receive pushback. It requires, after 
all, that we all surrender some privacy. But the benefits are undeniable, 
especially when it comes to two of the most pressing Fourth Amendment 
problems: the overuse and misuse of stop-and-frisks and the persistent 
problem of racial profiling. 
A. Stop-and-Frisks
As noted in Part II, the Court gave license to stop-and-frisk practices 
almost forty-five years ago in Terry v. Ohio.173 Balancing the needs of 
law enforcement to combat growing crime, the Court held that as long as 
an officer has specific and articulable facts, i.e., reasonable suspicion, to 
believe that “criminal activity may be afoot,”174 the Fourth Amendment
permits a limited detention and questioning of the person. If the officer 
also has reasonable suspicion that a person is armed and dangerous, the 
officer can couple the limited detention and questioning with a pat down 
for weapons: in common parlance, a stop-and-frisk.175
But as also noted in Part II, the “reasonable suspicion” standard is so 
malleable that it often means anything and nothing, which officers on the 
ground know well.176 Even more problematic, officers need only 
articulate their “reasonable suspicion” after the fact. Most officers know 
too that engaging in stop-and-frisks provides little risk to them. If 
contraband is found, the officer can issue a summons or make an arrest, 
the very process of which will color the propriety of the stop-and-frisk
upon judicial review, since judges are loath to exclude improperly 
obtained evidence.177 On the other side, if the officer finds no contraband 
or other basis for an arrest, the officer is still insulated, since the stop will 
almost always remain invisible to the courts. In a data-collecting 
jurisdiction, the stop may become a part of the statistics, but rarely 
                                                                                                                     
173. 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 27.
176. Jeffrey Fagan, Terry’s Original Sin, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43, 52 (“After nearly four 
decades, the Terry standard remains rather opaque.”).
177. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV.
757, 799 (1994) (“Judges do not like excluding bloody knives, so they distort doctrine, claiming 
the Fourth Amendment was not really violated.”).
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anything beyond that. Add to this one final problem: although the Court 
has been circumspect about this, the Court has essentially made clear that 
police may consider race in determining who to stop and who to frisk.178
I have argued previously that if the Fourth Amendment itself has a 
poisonous tree, its name is Terry v. Ohio.179 The reason is in the numbers.
Consider numbers from Floyd v. City of New York,180 a recent class-
action suit. Between January 2004 and June 2012, officers from the New 
York City Police Department made over 4.4 million forcible stops of 
individuals, 83% of whom were black or Hispanic.181 When considered 
as a percentage of the population, the numbers are even more jarring.
During a particular period, stops of whites, if spread across the population 
of New York City, would amount to stops of approximately 2.6% of the 
white population.182 By contrast, stops of blacks, if spread across the 
population, would amount to stops of approximately 21.1% of the 
population.183
Nor is New York alone. Studies have found evidence of racial 
profiling in Los Angeles: A study by Professor Ian Ayres found that the 
stop rate was 3,400 stops higher per 10,000 residents for blacks than for 
whites, and 360 stops higher for Hispanics than for whites, even after 
controlling for variables such as the rate of violent and property crimes.184
In addition, police were 127% more likely to search stopped blacks than 
to search stopped whites, and 43% more likely to search stopped 
                                                                                                                     
178. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811–13 (1996) (suggesting that racial 
targeting is irrelevant under the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 
543, 563 (1976) (allowing race as a permissible factor in conducting border stops); United States 
v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886–87 (1975) (permitting “Mexican appearance” as a factor in 
border stops); see also Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal 
Procedure, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1543, 1575 (2011); Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in 
America Became the Law of the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United 
States and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1022 (2010); Sheri Lynn 
Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214, 230–33 (1983) (discussing 
use of race at border stops).
179. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and the Equality 
Principle, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 32 (2011).
180. 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
181. Id. at 573–74. This number is likely conservative, since officers sometimes neglect to 
document each stop. Id. at 559; see also First Report of Independent Monitor at 8, Floyd, 959 F.
Supp. 2d 540 (No. 513).
182. See Analysis of New NYPD Stop-and-Frisk Data Reveals Dramatic Impact on 
Black New Yorkers, ACLU (Nov. 26, 2007), http://www.aclu.org/racialjustice/racialprofiling/
33095prs20071126.html.
183. Id.
184. IAN AYRES & JONATHAN BOROWSKY, RACIAL PROFILING AND THE LAPD: A STUDY OF 
RACIALLY DISPARATE OUTCOMES IN THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 27 (2008),
https://www.aclusocal.org/sites/default/files/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/99227648-Racial-
Profiling-the-LAPD.pdf.
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Hispanics than stopped whites.185 In Philadelphia, a recent review of 
pedestrian stops found that 80.23% of the stops were of minorities, far 
greater than their representation in the population.186 In Maryland, a
report by the Maryland State Police found that African-Americans 
comprised 72.9% of all of the drivers that were stopped and searched 
along a stretch of I-95, even though they comprised only 17.5% of the 
drivers violating traffic laws on the road.187 In Boston, an analysis of 
more than 200,000 Boston Police Department records of police–citizen 
encounters (which include observations, interrogations, stops, frisks, and 
searches) revealed that blacks were subjected to 63% of these encounters 
even though they make up just 24% of Boston’s population.188 Even when 
controlling for crime, alleged gang affiliation, and other non-race factors, 
the numbers are still disproportionately high. In New Jersey, statistician 
John Lambert’s study revealed that black drivers along Interstate I-95
were 4.85 times more likely to be stopped than similarly situated 
whites.189 Similar racial disparities have been found in a host of 
jurisdictions, both large and small.190
All of this is problematic. It is certainly inconsistent with the Court’s
decisions favoring race neutrality in government action.191 Equally 
troubling, as Professor Bernard Harcourt persuasively argues, racial 
profiling may actually have the perverse effect of increasing the overall 
                                                                                                                     
185. Id.
186. Plaintiff’s Fifth Report to Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices at 13, Bailey 
v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2015).
187. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Enforcement of Settlement 
Agreement and for Further Relief at 4, Wilkins v. Md. State Police, No. MJG-93-468 (D. Md. 
Dec. 7, 1993); see also David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: 
The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 566 (1997)
(citing a Maryland State Police reporting that of 732 citizens detained and searched by the 
Maryland State Police, 75% were African-Americans).
188. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, BLACK, BROWN AND TARGETED: A REPORT ON BOSTON 
POLICE DEPARTMENT STREET ENCOUNTERS FROM 2007–2010, at 6 (2014), 
http://www.bostonherald.com/sites/default/files/media/2014/10/08/black_brown_and_targeted_
online.pdf.
189. John Lamberth, Driving While Black: A Statistician Proves That Prejudice Still Rules 
the Road, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING: NEW AND ESSENTIAL READINGS 32, 33 (Stephen K. 
Rice & Michael D. White eds., 2010).
190. Capers, supra note 113, at 850–51, 850 n.86 (citing to jurisdictions); see also David A. 
Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While Black” Matters, 84 MINN.
L. REV. 265, 267 (1999).
191. See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal 
Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1075, 1108–09 (2001) (stating that the 
Supreme Court now reviews policies that concern racial classification under strict scrutiny); Ian 
Haney-López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1783 (2012) (stating that the court 
subjects affirmative action to the highest level of scrutiny under judicial review).
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societal rate of offending.192 And yet there is a cognate problem with 
Terry as applied that has received far less attention: its breadth. Consider 
again the numbers from New York, where data indicate that, 
conservatively speaking, approximately 4.4 million individuals were 
forcibly stopped over the course of eight years.193 There is a reason why 
this number is the first detail mentioned in Floyd. Even setting aside 
racial disparities, the sheer volume with which individuals of all races are 
stopped should raise concerns.
This becomes especially true when we consider the goal of accuracy.
For every twenty individuals stopped, a full nineteen were found not to 
be engaged in activity warranting an arrest.194 In other words, the 
accuracy rate was around 5%. And even this overstates the true accuracy 
rate, since studies have shown that nearly half of all of arrests resulting 
from these stop-and-frisks encounters are eventually dismissed.195 The 
accuracy rate drops even more precipitously when one considers the oft-
stated objective of aggressive stop-and-frisk practices: to get illegal 
firearms out of the hands of criminals.196 According to the NYPD’s own 
data, their accuracy rate for finding guns during stop-and-frisks was 1 in 
1,000 stops.197 As economist Jeff Fagan has observed, this is on par with 
the success rate when officers have conducted purely random searches.198
Moreover, evidence suggests that racialized policing increases 
inaccuracy, not accuracy. In New York, for example, frisked blacks were 
actually less likely to have a weapon than frisked whites.199 In Maryland, 
the “hit rate” was also lower for searched blacks than for searched 
whites.200 Similar results come from New Jersey, where troopers found 
                                                                                                                     
192. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND 
PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 3 (2007) (arguing the “use of probabilistic methods may 
increase the overall amount of targeted crime”).
193. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
194. Id. at 558. It is possible that even Justice Scalia would have found this error rate 
unacceptable. See Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1695 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(suggesting that a hit rate of less than 5% would be insufficient to justify reasonable suspicion).
195. See, e.g., ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., A REPORT 
ON ARRESTS ARISING FROM THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S STOP-AND-FRISK 
PRACTICES 8 (2013), https://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/OAG_REPORT_ON_SQF_PRACTICES_
NOV_2013. pdf.
196. Barry Paddock, Kelly: Stop-and-Frisk Saves Lives by Taking Guns off the Street, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS (Apr. 4, 2013, 2:57 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/kelly-stop-and-
frisk-saves-lives-article-1.1306828.
197. Paddock, supra note 196.
198. See Second Supplemental Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D. at 35, Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d 
540.
199. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. at 574.
200. See DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK
80 (2002).
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evidence of criminal activity in 13% of their searches of black motorists, 
compared with 25% of their searches of white motorists.201 Add to this 
yet another problem revealed by analyses of stop-and-frisk practices: 
often the claimed articulated reasonable suspicion is legally inadequate.
For example, a 2012 audit of a random sample of almost 2,000 stops in 
Philadelphia found that over 40% of the stop-and-frisks could not be 
legally justified.202 The foregoing suggests not just a racialized policing 
problem, but also a related but distinct over-inclusiveness problem. It 
suggests that stop-and-frisks, although notionally a tool to apprehend 
criminals, in fact has a breadth that disproportionately affects those who 
are Terry innocent.203 If one of the animating concerns of the Framers 
was the widespread use of general warrants204—open-ended warrants to 
search anyone and seize anything—then the widespread, over-inclusive 
use of warrantless stop-and-search practices suggests that the Fourth 
Amendment is not protecting the rights as citizens as was originally 
intended.205
B. Big Data, Terahertz Scanners, and Machine Learning
Terry’s problems are multifaceted, but they are not insurmountable.
Here again technology can provide a much-needed doctrinal assist, this 
time by drastically improving accuracy.
Consider first how technology can reduce the over-inclusiveness 
problem. Recall that the stated goal of aggressive stop-and-frisk practices 
such as those deployed in New York City is to get firearms out of the 
hands of criminals.206 In fact, there is technology that can scan for 
concealed weapons without the need for a stop or frisk.207 The device, 
which measures terahertz radiation, is small enough to be placed in a 
police vehicle or even mounted as a surveillance camera.208 As the New 
York City Police Commissioner put it during a public announcement:
                                                                                                                     
201. Id.
202. Plaintiffs’ Third Report to Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices at 6, 8, Bailey 
v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2013).
203. This Article uses this term, “Terry innocent,” to describe individuals who are not found 
to be engaged in criminal activity warranting an arrest or summons.
204. See WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING
134–35 (2009) (discussing the pervasive use of the general warrant in colonial America).
205. See Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1505 (1996) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment should 
consider intrusions on the innocent).
206. See Paddock, supra note 196.
207. See John Del Signore, NYPD “Takes Delivery” of Portable Body Scanners to Detect 
Concealed Weapons on the Street, GOTHAMIST (Jan. 23, 2013, 12:46 PM) (quoting Police Comm’r 
Raymond Kelly), http://gothamist.com/2013/01/23/nypd_takes_delivery_of_van-mounted.php.
208. Id.
33
Capers: Policing, Technology, and Doctrinal Assists
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
756 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
The device reads a specific form of natural energy emitted 
by people and objects known as terahertz. If something is 
obstructing the flow of that radiation, for example a weapon, 
the device will highlight that object. Over the past twelve 
months, we’ve been working with the vendor and the 
London Metropolitan Police to develop a tool that meets our 
requirements. We took delivery of it last week. 
One of our requirements was that the technology must be 
portable . . . we’re able to mount it in a truck.209
Add to this the use of facial recognition technology, already in use by 
over fifty police departments,210 and which can access not just arrest 
photos, but also drivers’ license photos and photos on social media sites 
like Facebook.211 One such technology is FaceIt.
FaceIt is a facial recognition software engine helping a 
network of cameras and computers to quickly detect and 
recognize faces. When a head-like object moves within the 
camera’s field of vision . . . the computer guesses whether it 
is a face. If the answer is yes, FaceIt crops the face from the 
background and “normalizes” the image by compensating 
for size and lighting. The image is then subjected to a Local 
Feature Analysis that essentially generates a faceprint—a
digital code encapsulating the measurements of the 
landmarks of a face and how they correlate. . . . Accessories 
such as wigs, moustaches, glasses, even basic plastic 
surgery, will not affect identification.212
Now add access to Big Data to the equation. Already, the breadth and 
                                                                                                                     
209. Id. Assuming the device could only reveal the presence of a concealed weapon, using 
the device would not constitute a Fourth Amendment search under current precedent. See United
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124 (1984) (treating searches that can only reveal the presence 
or absence of contraband as non-searches under the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Place, 
462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (same). This should be true even where one is licensed to carry a firearm, 
at least in areas where having a license is uncommon, just as canine sniffs for narcotics are non-
searches even where one, say, has a medical marijuana license. But see Jeffrey Bellin, The Right 
to Remain Armed, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2015) (arguing that, given increased Second 
Amendment protections, possession of a handgun without more may be inadequate justification 
for a Fourth Amendment stop).
210. Sabrina A. Lochner, Note, Saving Face: Regulating Law Enforcement’s Use of Mobile 
Facial Recognition Technology & Iris Scans, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 201, 233 (2013).
211. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U.
PA. L. REV. 327, 367 (2015). 
212. Alexander T. Nguyen, Here’s Looking at You, Kid: Has Face-Recognition Technology 
Completely Outflanked the Fourth Amendment?, 7 VA. J.L. & TECH. 2, 5–6 (2002) (footnotes 
omitted); see Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss: 
Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407, 409 (2012).
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depth of information available (from credit card transactions to credit 
history, from Facebook likes to Twitter feeds, from favorite bands to 
political affiliations) is vast. Consider a report from just a few years ago:
[I]n 2013 the amount of stored information in the world is 
estimated to be around 1,200 exabytes, of which less than 2 
percent is non-digital. 
There is no good way to think about what this size of data 
means. If it were all printed in books, they would cover the 
entire surface of the United States some 52 layers thick. If it 
were placed on CD-ROMs and stacked up, they would 
stretch to the moon in five separate piles.213
Quite simply, whether it involves tracking location history by 
remotely accessing and analyzing metadata on our phones, or accessing 
surveillance camera data (both public and private), or turning to 
commercial data aggregators, the police have or will soon have at their 
disposal law enforcement tools unlike any before. In a matter of seconds, 
“unknown suspects can be known.”214
Now combine access to Big Data with Automated Suspicion
Algorithms (ASAs), algorithms created by applying machine learning 
methods to troves of government and private data with the purpose of 
identifying potential criminal activity.215 Already, ASAs are in operation.
For example, computer systems already use public and private high-
resolution surveillance cameras to identify suspicious bags abandoned in 
public areas. The algorithms can identify which bags (by shape, size, 
                                                                                                                     
213. VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT 
WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 9 (2013).
214. Ferguson, supra note 211, at 351. One can imagine access to data being limited to non-
intimate information. For a discussion of this possibility, see Note, Data Mining, Dog Sniffs, and 
the Fourth Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 691, 712 (2014).
215. Automated Suspicion Algorithms, or ASAs, are software programs that employ 
machine learning to predict individual criminality. As Professor Rich states, ASAs share three 
characteristics:
First, they are based on algorithms, which can be broadly defined as sequences 
of instructions to convert an input into an output. In this case, ASAs convert data 
about an individual and her behavior into predictions of the likelihood that she is 
engaged in criminal conduct. Second, ASAs assess individuals based on 
suspicion of criminal activity . . . . Third, ASAs automate the process of 
identifying suspicious individuals from data: they comb through data for factors 
that correlate to criminal activity, assess the weight of each factor and how it 
relates to other factors, use the results to predict criminality from new data, and 
continuously improve their performance over time.
Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth 
Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871, 876 (2016) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
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placement, timing) may possibly conceal an explosive, as opposed to a 
discarded beer can, and send an automatic alert to the police.216 Equally 
important, the algorithms learn from their mistakes and successes.217 It 
does all of this with minimal human involvement. ASAs applied to 
individuals would be similar. As professor Michael Rich has explored, 
“One day soon, a machine will identify likely criminal activity and, with 
the beep of an e-mail delivery, the buzz of an alarm, or the silent creation 
of a report, tell police where to find it.”218
To be clear, these technologies raise privacy and other concerns.219
But perhaps counterintuitively, they can also be privacy enhancing by 
improving accuracy so that Terry is no longer error-friendly. In other 
words, techno-policing can improve accuracy so that the police can 
actually target likely criminals rather than the Terry innocent. The over-
inclusiveness problem with stop-and-frisks, after all, is that police are 
imperfect judges of whether “criminal activity [is] afoot” (the first 
requirement of Terry) and whether the person under observation is 
connected to that activity (the second Terry requirement).220 Having 
access to at-a-distance weapons scanners, facial recognition software, 
and Big Data can significantly increase accuracy and restore the “right to 
be let alone”221 to the rest of us. Terahertz scanners would tell the police 
that the bulge in a teenager’s jacket is nothing more than a bulky 
cellphone; facial recognition technology combined with Big Data and 
Automated Suspicion Algorithms would tell the police that the driver 
repeatedly circling the block in fact works in the neighborhood and is 
probably looking for a parking space; that the clean-cut looking man who 
seems to be admiring a home-owner’s garden in fact is violating an order 
of protection; and that the kid with the book bag running down the street 
is simply that, a kid running down the street.222
                                                                                                                     
216. See Ross Andersen, An Eye Without an ‘I’: Justice and the Rise of Automated 
Surveillance, ATLANTIC (June 14, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/
06/an-eye-without-an-i-justice-and-the-rise-of-automated-surveillance/258082/.
217. See Rich, supra note 215, at 905.
218. Id. at 872.
219. For example, algorithms are only as reliable as the inputs, and can reflect the biases of 
their programmers. See Claire Cain Miller, When Algorithms Discriminate, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/upshot/when-algorithms-discriminate.html?action
=click&pgtype=Homepage&version=Moth-Visible&module=inside-nyt-region&region=inside-
nyt-region&WT.nav=inside-nyt-region&_r=1&abt=0002&abg=1.
220. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
221. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 361–62 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
222. For example, relying solely on “commonsense,” the Court has long held that flight from 
police in a high crime area, standing alone, provides reasonable suspicion to justify a stop. Illinois 
v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000). In fact, empirical evidence demonstrates the opposite: 
“that in high-crime urban communities where the population is disproportionately minority, flight 
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With the goal of accuracy in mind, techno-policing can also play a 
role in addressing the bête noire of stop-and-frisk policing, racial 
profiling. To be clear, most racialized policing is likely not the product 
of intentional discrimination. But we know from social cognition research 
that implicit biases about race—those assumptions and associations we 
have even when we believe we are “race-blind”—are practically 
universal.223 These implicit biases include associations with race and 
criminality. Using technology can neutralize implicit biases and move us 
closer to a Fourth Amendment that is applied equally. Rather than relying 
on race-based heuristics, techno-policing would be able to tell from afar, 
in a way that is not intrusive or embarrassing, whether someone is a 
troublemaker casing a neighborhood, or a student returning home with a 
bag of Skittles and a Snapple iced tea;224 a loiterer, or a father waiting to 
pick up his children from school;225 a burglar, or a Harvard professor 
entering his own home;226 a mugger, or the future United States Attorney 
General.227 This is accuracy.
To be sure, the techno-policing this Article advocates is not a cure-all 
in terms of making policing more accurate, especially given how
                                                                                                                     
from an identifiable police officer is a very poor indicator that crime is afoot.” See Tracey L. 
Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: Transparent Adjudication and Social Science 
Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733, 792 (2000).
Automated Suspicion Algorithms, since they are based on data-derived probabilities, would learn 
and know this.
223. See ADAM BENFORADO, UNFAIR: THE NEW SCIENCE OF CRIMINAL INJUSTICE 19–20
(2015); Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and Their 
Behavioral Manifestations, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 143, 146 (2004) (discussing implicit prejudice and 
stereotype themes in today’s world); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489,
1491–1528 (2005); L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN.
L. REV. 2035, 2043–44 (2011).
224. The reference is to Trayvon Martin, the unarmed black youth shot by neighborhood 
watchman George Zimmerman.
225. The reference is to an incident in which the police assumed a black man outside of an 
elite private school might be engaged in criminal activity. In fact, he was waiting for his children. 
Joanna Rothkopf, “I’m Not Your Brother!”: Video Reveals Police’s Stunning Double-Standard 
for Black Americans, SALON (Aug. 29, 2014, 4:45 PM),
http://www.salon.com/2014/08/29/st_paul_cops_
tase_and_arrest_black_man_for_waiting_to_pick_his_kids_up_from_preschool/.
226. The reference is to the arrest of Harvard Professor Henry Louis Gates after an officer 
suspected him of burglary as he entered his own home. See, e.g., Abby Goodnough, Harvard 
Professor Jailed; Officer Is Accused of Bias, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/21/us/21gates.html. As I have detailed elsewhere, a number of 
law-abiding minority professors—Cornel West, William Julius Wilson, Paul Butler, and Devon 
Carbado, to name just a few—have been subjected to police stops. Capers, supra note 179, at 18.
227. See Gene Demby, Two Tales of Profiling, from the Highest Offices in the Land, NPR
(July 19, 2013, 7:20 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/codeswitch/2013/07/19/203715163/two-
tales-of-profiling-from-the-highest-offices-in-the-land (quoting Att’y Gen. Eric Holder 
describing being profiled by the police).
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interconnected, how networked,228 every aspect of our criminal justice 
system is. And to be sure, because any technology has the potential to 
replicate or exacerbate existing inequalities and disparities, significant 
checks such as race audits will be required.229 But it is a significant step 
in the right direction. Indeed, given that more democratic policing will 
likely increase perceptions of legitimacy—Professor Tyler’s argument 
again230—it may even result in the reduction of crime.
IV. O BRAVE NEW WORLD231
It is one thing to proffer illustrations of the types of technology that 
can be harnessed to strengthen Fourth Amendment protections. It is 
another to propose workable plans for incentivizing the turn to 
technology. This Part attempts to do just that. Specifically, this Part turns
to the role legislators can play in requiring, or at least encouraging, the 
use of technology that enhances Fourth Amendment protections; and it 
turns to the role courts can play in reimagining a robust Fourth 
Amendment. It then anticipates and addresses potential objections.
A. A Role for Courts
Courts can play a role in promoting the use of technology that 
enhances Fourth Amendment protections by saying “no” and by saying 
“yes.” This requires some explanation: Courts should say no when law 
enforcement officers attempt to rationalize warrantless searches by 
offering justifications that no longer make sense given current and readily 
available technology. For example, a court should say “no” when an 
officer conducts a warrantless search of a vehicle and justifies the search 
by simply invoking the vehicle exception to the warrant requirement.
Recall that the vehicle exception was predicated on the inability of 
officers to quickly secure a warrant.232 While that exception made sense 
in 1925 and through the early 1990s, it hardly makes sense today, and 
courts should respond accordingly. While urging courts to say no may 
seem radical, in fact the Supreme Court has already begun to do just that.
In Schmerber v. California, the Court permitted the warrantless drawing 
                                                                                                                     
228. For a discussion of network theory, see Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, Our
Criminal Network, and the Wire, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 459, 468–69 (2011).
229. Robin A. Lenhardt, Race Audits, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1527, 1534 (2011).
230. Tyler & Fagan, supra note 172, at 235.
231. The reference is not to Aldous Huxley’s dystopic Brave New World, but rather to its 
title’s source: Shakespeare’s The Tempest, and the words spoken by Miranda. “How beauteous 
mankind is! O brave new world, That has such people in’t!”. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE 
TEMPEST act 5, sc. 1.
232. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
38
Florida Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol69/iss3/2
2017] POLICING, TECHNOLOGY, AND DOCTRINAL ASSISTS 761
and testing of blood because securing a timely warrant was impractical.233
In Missouri v. McNeely, the Court considered the “advances in the 47 
years since Schmerber” and the availability of technology that allows for 
the “more expeditious processing of warrant applications” to reverse 
course and say “no.”234
Courts can also advance Fourth Amendment protections by saying 
“yes,” and saying it loudly. It has long been recognized that the Court has 
a teaching function.235 One way to educate is by saying “yes” when law 
enforcement officers use technology that enhances Fourth Amendment 
protections. Again, an example may be useful. Imagine a police 
department initiates a policy that requires its officers to make audio 
recordings of requests for consent. In such jurisdictions, courts should not 
only view the existence of an audio recording as another factor under 
Schneckloth’s “totality of the circumstances” test.236 Rather, courts can 
make clear that they view such evidence as having almost dispositive 
weight. In short, courts should reward officers—through the easy 
admission of evidence—in cases that include a recording of voluntary 
consent.237 The point here is that merely by saying “yes,” and saying it 
loudly, courts can make a difference by changing police norms and police 
culture. A perfect example of this is how expectations changed in the 
1970s after courts began saying “yes” to written consent forms.238
Without ever mandating the use of such forms—which the Court could 
have required as a judicially mandated prophylactic—the Court made the 
use of such forms almost universal by saying “yes.”239 As of 2013, only 
four states do not use written consent forms.240
                                                                                                                     
233. 384 U.S. 757, 770–72 (1966).
234. 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1555 (2013).
235. As a former dean of Yale Law School famously put it, the Justices “are inevitably 
teachers in a vital national seminar.” Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial 
Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193, 208 (1952).
236. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).
237. Conversely, courts should deter officers—excluding evidence or at least making the 
admission more difficult—where officers have failed to document the circumstances of consent 
through an audio recording. Indeed, state courts can even require such evidence as necessary to 
reasonableness under state constitutions. For a discussion of the trend of states relying on state 
constitutions to extend more protections to its citizens that are required by the federal Fourth 
Amendment, see Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States: How to Apply the Fourth 
Amendment and Its State Analogs to Protect Third Party Information from Unreasonable Search,
55 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 393 (2006); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the 
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977); William J. Brennan, Jr., The 
Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights,
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 548 (1986).
238. See Leong & Suyeishi, supra note 166, at 768–69.
239. Id.
240. For more, see Leong & Suyeishi, supra note 166, at 774.
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B. A Role for Legislatures
Perhaps not surprisingly, courts acting alone are sometimes 
inadequate to the task of regulating law enforcement practices to preserve 
individual protections.241 Accordingly, scholars are increasingly calling 
for the involvement of “multiple institutions applying complementary 
approaches”242 to ensure the proper balance between the rights of the state 
and the rights of the individual. One such institution is the legislature, 
both at the federal and local level.243
First, consider Congress. Much of the argument put forward thus far 
urges a return to warrants. Congress can facilitate this return by taking 
the lead on ensuring that federal warrants can be obtained expeditiously.
To be sure, Congress took steps in this regard in 1977 when it amended 
Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to permit officers to 
seek warrants via telephone.244 The rationale for the 1977 amendment 
bears noting. Congress believed that the availability of telephonic 
warrants would “encourage Federal law enforcement officers to seek 
search warrants in situations where they might otherwise conduct 
warrantless searches.”245 The availability of telephonic warrants would 
thus allow officers the means “to opt for the safer legal course of trying 
to obtain a search warrant before taking unilateral action.”246 While the 
inclusion in 1977 of telephonic warrants should be commended, 
technological advances now make the mechanics for obtaining a warrant 
via telephone seem antiquated. For example, Rule 41 requires that both 
the affiant and the magistrate have before them a physical warrant and 
requires an actual signature.247 But neither of these requirements makes 
sense in an age where documentation can be paperless, where access to 
shared file storage like DropBox and Google Drive is commonplace, and 
                                                                                                                     
241. Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 764 (2012) 
(observing that courts lack the capacity “to undertake complex empirical analysis of policing or 
to constrain the police beyond identifying and enforcing constitutional rights”).
242. David M. Jaros, Preempting the Police, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1149, 1152 (2014); see also
Harmon, supra note 241, at 817 (calling for the involvement of multiple institutions to work 
together in “the complex task of articulating and implementing a form of policing that is both 
effective and harm efficient”).
243. Professor Charles Reich called for this approach in 1966, arguing that courts should not 
be “the first line of approach in regulating police work.” Charles A. Reich, Police Questioning of 
Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L.J. 1161, 1170 (1966). Rather, “[l]egislatively and 
administratively, it is possible for a community to establish guidelines for police and citizens as 
well.” Id.
244. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(3).
245. S. REP. NO. 95-354, at 10 (1977).
246. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Hearings Before 
the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the Comm. of the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 61 (1977).
247. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.
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where signatures can be electronic. To require these procedures is on par 
with adhering to, say, the best evidence rule long after it has served its 
course. The goal is to make obtaining warrants easier, and Congress 
should take the lead in doing this.
Congress, however, is just the start. States, counties, and cities each
have the ability to experiment and to provide incentives and protections 
that go beyond the floor of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, localities 
“have an unrivalled ability to focus attention on an issue, convene key 
stakeholders and insist they work together, connect with residents at the 
neighborhood level, carry out the vision, and ensure a focus on results.”248
To borrow from Professor Richard Briffault, who in turn channeled 
Justice Louis Brandeis:
Many years ago, Justice Brandeis famously offered a 
defense of federalism in terms of the possibility that state 
autonomy provides for innovation. As he observed, “a single 
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a 
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country.” Well, if the fifty 
states are laboratories for public policy formation, then 
surely the 3,000 counties and 15,000 municipalities provide 
logarithmically more opportunities for innovation, 
experimentation, and reform. Thousands of local 
governments provide thousands of arenas for innovation.249
Indeed, jurisdictions have already begun to experiment with 
technology to enhance protections. Cities have experimented, with great 
success, in requiring officers to wear body cameras. Jurisdictions have 
experimented with e-warrants. Cities are experimenting with facial 
recognition technology and long-range scanners for weapons. And 
jurisdictions are experimenting with providing law enforcement officers 
access to Big Data. The task ahead is to foster more experimentation. For 
example, one can imagine a jurisdiction experimenting with having 
judicial officers on call, via FaceTime, to adjudicate in real time police–
citizen encounters when it comes to securing consent, or to sign off on 
warrants in advance of car searches or claims of exigent circumstances.
One can imagine a jurisdiction requiring officers to “write” e-tickets 
when they conduct stop-and-frisks. The possibilities are many.
                                                                                                                     
248. NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES & INST. FOR YOUTH, EDUC., & FAMILIES, VITAL PARTNERS,
MAYORS AND POLICE CHIEFS WORKING TOGETHER FOR AMERICA’S CHILDREN AND YOUTH 1
(2006), https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p126-pub.pdf.
249. Richard Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century, 36 URB. LAW. 253, 259 
(2004) (footnote omitted) (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
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C.  Counterarguments
Any suggestions for changes are sure to meet resistance and counter-
arguments. I address the most obvious counter-arguments below.
Costs. Every change comes with costs, and one can imagine a cost-
based objection to the proposals put forth in this Article. In fact, one could 
imagine two cost-based objections: one to the financial costs associated 
with outfitting the police with Fourth Amendment enhancing technology, 
and one to the “cost” associated with having more front-end involvement 
by judicial officers in term of issuing warrants and deciding, in real time, 
issues of probable cause or consent. Both of these objections are easily 
addressed. Turning to the first cost argument, much of the technology this 
Article puts forward—whether it is using a communication platform such 
as FaceTime or Google Hangout to quickly secure warrants or providing 
officers access to Big Data—have almost negligible costs. Indeed, as 
technology experts have noted, because apps can be endlessly replicated, 
they are a type of technology that is “subject to different economics, 
where abundance is the norm rather than scarcity.”250
More challenging is the objection based on the costs involved with 
having magistrates or other judicial officers251 available on the front end.
Right now, the role of judicial officers is usually confined to when an 
arrest is made or contraband is seized. In other words, judicial officers 
have virtually no involvement in the vast majority of stop-and-frisks, or 
consensual encounters, or requests for consent, or even car searches. To
be sure, getting judicial officers involved on the front end will involve a 
sizable investment in resources, but that investment on the front end is 
likely to be recouped on the back end. To elaborate, right now, 
magistrates are involved in only a fraction of police–citizen encounters, 
namely, the fraction of encounters that result in an arrest or the seizure of 
contraband. However, with respect to this fraction of encounters, the 
judge’s role becomes outsized. With respect to arrests, the judge must 
decide probable cause hearings. With respect to seizures of contraband, 
the judge must review affidavits and memoranda in support of motions 
to suppress, as well as responding papers. The judge may preside over 
suppression hearings that can last for days. And where decisions are 
difficult and likely to be revisited on appeal, the judge may find herself 
writing, in anticipation of appeal, a lengthy decision denying the 
                                                                                                                     
250. ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND MACHINE AGE: WORK,
PROGRESS, AND PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT TECHNOLOGIES 10 (2014). 
251. As the Court has acknowledged, there is no requirement in the Fourth Amendment that 
the reviewing officer in fact be a magistrate or even have a law degree, so long as he is neutral 
and detached. See Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 352 (1972).
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suppression motion.252 All of this is time consuming. The judge’s role is 
also myopic. The overwhelming number of problematic police 
interactions with law-abiding citizens simply remains invisible; a judge 
never sees them. Involving magistrates on the front end, however, lessens 
the burden of deciding cases on the back end. Once a magistrate issues a 
warrant on the front end, for example, that decision becomes almost 
unassailable because of the Court’s decision in United States v. Leon253
creating a “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule.254 More 
importantly, such technology can make visible and reviewable everyday 
police–citizen interactions, which in itself can “help change 
constitutional meaning.”255 In short, the investment in magistrate time on 
the front end is in fact likely a redirection of existing resources, since it 
diminishes the very real costs on the back end.
Perverse effects. There is also the issue of perverse effects, especially 
with respect to the proposals regarding stop-and-frisk practices. The 
concern, stated broadly, is that law enforcement officers will use this 
technology in ways that further racial disparities. They will use remote 
scanners in minority neighborhoods, not majority neighborhoods. Indeed, 
in its platform, the Black Lives Matter movement has expressed precisely 
these concerns about the turn towards surveillance.256 My hope is that 
where communities are concerned that law enforcement may be singling 
out communities in ways that are inappropriate, they can quite literally 
check such activities. For example, Professor Robin Lenhardt has 
proposed that municipalities conduct “race audits” to check to inequitable 
conditions.257 Something similar could also be employed here.258
A related issue is that, even if such technology is used in race-neutral 
ways, it will nonetheless replicate and perhaps exacerbate existing racial 
disparities in the criminal justice system. To the extent the police use 
facial recognition and Big Data to determine who has a criminal record, 
this focus will result in the hyper-surveillance of individuals who are 
                                                                                                                     
252. The court might alternatively write a decision granting a suppression motion, if the court 
anticipates an interlocutory appeal.
253. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
254. Id. at 904. Under the exception, evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant later declared 
to be invalid will not be excluded so long as a reasonably trained officer would have believed the 
warrant was valid. Id.
255. Simonson, supra note 6, at 425.
256. See End the War on Black People, MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES,
https://policy.m4bl.org/end-war-on-black-people/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2016) (calling for, among 
other things, an end to the mass surveillance of black individuals and expressing concerns about 
technologies, such as body cameras, that criminalize and target black communities).
257. Lenhardt, supra note 229, at 1534.
258. To the extent individual officers are using technology in ways that are discriminatory 
or otherwise inappropriate, that too can be checked. The use of technology will leave its own data 
trail, allowing reviewing authorities to know exactly what steps an officer took prior to, during, 
and after an encounter, stop, or frisk.
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already victims of a racialized penal system, and thus more likely to have 
arrest records. While this concern is a troubling one, there is reason to 
think that it may be significantly less troubling in practice. Many arrests 
and convictions will simply be irrelevant, both as an evidentiary matter 
and as a Fourth Amendment matter, to a stop-and-frisk. For example, an 
arrest record for possession of a personal use quantity of marijuana, 
discovered through access to Big Data, is only minimally relevant to 
whether someone standing in front of a clothing store is casing a store to 
rob it or merely window shopping. By contrast, an arrest or conviction 
that does matter—i.e., a prior arrest or conviction for possession of 
burglary tools—should matter. And again, this is where self-checks or 
race audits can come in. To the extent technology is inappropriately 
replicating racial disparities—or other disparities for that matter—
adjustments can be made.
Data Control. For civil libertarians in particular, there is also the 
matter of control. If law enforcement officers are, for example, recording 
the verbal exchanges during requests for consent, who will have access 
to the recordings? If there are surveillance cameras in public, how long 
with those video records be stored? Will the press have access? And if 
law enforcement officers are using facial surveillance and data mining to 
know everything about us—not just whether we engage in crime, but also 
where we shop, whether we attend church, whether we subscribe to the 
sexual hook-up App Grindr or browse profiles on the website Ashley 
Madison (“the world’s leading married dating service for discreet 
encounters”)259—how do we keep such information from being misused? 
Will such information be subject to Freedom of Information Act 
requests? These are all weighty questions, but my response is brief and at 
bottom is reducible to this: These problems are not insurmountable, as 
our past history should make clear. We already regulate access to DNA 
and fingerprint evidence, for example. Surely we can regulate access to 
other types of data.
The End of Privacy. One can imagine a final objection: that allowing 
law enforcement access to Big Data and other technology will spell the 
end of the privacy as we know it. The Government will become James 
Stewart’s character in Rear Window, peering through our windows to 
learn all our secrets.260 The Government will become the couple in John 
Cheever’s The Enormous Radio, able to listen in on every conversation 
                                                                                                                     
259. Lance Whitney, Adultery Site Ashley Madison Confirms Leak of Actual User Data,
CNET (Aug. 19, 2015, 10:22 AM) https://www.cnet.com/news/adultery-site-ashley-madison-
confirms-leak-of-actual-user-data/.
260. REAR WINDOW (Paramount Pictures 1954).
44
Florida Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol69/iss3/2
2017] POLICING, TECHNOLOGY, AND DOCTRINAL ASSISTS 767
with the mere turn of a radio dial.261 In short, the Government will 
become the Big Brother of George Orwell’s 1984.
This Article’s response to this “end-of-privacy” argument is three-
fold. The first observation may sound flippant, but it is not intended it to 
be. The observation is this: That ship has sailed. Or to put it in more 
contemporary terms, that satellite (with its tracking technology) was 
launched into orbit a long time ago. To complain about the loss of privacy 
is to ignore how much privacy we have surrendered in recent years. There 
is a reason why the online retail giant Amazon has obtained a patent for 
“anticipatory shipping,” a technology that would allow Amazon to ship 
products before orders have been placed.262 And why the political ads we 
receive seem tailored to our individual concerns,263 and why the music 
we listen to now “is now listening to us.”264 There is a reason too that 
Target knows when women are pregnant,265 that Netflix knows about my 
obsession with both The Wire and Downton Abbey and Buffy the Vampire 
Slayer; and that, after shopping for L.L.Bean rain boots, advertisements 
for galoshes will invade your browser. The reason is because we have 
surrendered part of our privacy in exchange for convenience and ease.
There is a second response to the “end of privacy” argument: 
Although we may have lost some privacy due to technology, in fact, the 
lack of privacy we have today is not that new. Rather, it shares much with 
the quantity and quality of privacy that most citizens had when the Fourth 
Amendment was ratified. Recall that in 1791, most citizens lived in small 
communities. If one missed service at church, the community knew. And 
                                                                                                                     
261. JOHN CHEEVER, The Enormous Radio, in THE STORIES OF JOHN CHEEVER 33, 33–41
(1978).
262. See Greg Bensinger, Amazon Wants to Ship Your Package Before You Buy It, WALL ST.
J.: DIGITS (Jan. 17, 2014, 3:12 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/01/17/amazon-wants-to-
ship-your-package-before-you-buy-it/?KEYWORDS=amazon+anticipatory; see also Praveen 
Kopalle, Why Amazon’s Anticipatory Shipping Is Pure Genius, FORBES (Jan. 28, 2014, 11:34 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/onmarketing/2014/01/28/why-amazons-anticipatory-shipping
-is-pure-genius/#1936cb102fac (discussing Amazon’s anticipatory shipping system).
263. Micah Cohen, From Campaign War Room to Big-Data Broom, N.Y. TIMES (June 19,
2013, 10:56 PM), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/from-campaign-war-room-to-big-
data-broom/?_r=0; How Campaigns Amass Your Personal Information to Deliver Tailored 
Political Ads, PBS: NEWSHOUR (Oct. 29, 2012, 12:00 AM),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics-july-dec12-frontline_10-29/.
264. How the Music Industry Uses Big Data to Create the Next Big Hit, PBS: NEWSHOUR
(Nov. 27, 2014, 8:26 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/music-industry-uses-big-data-
create-next-big-hit/; see also Derek Thompson, The Shazam Effect, ATLANTIC (Dec. 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/12/the-shazam-effect/382237/ (discussing 
how an app created to identify an unknown song title is now used by record companies as an 
early-detection system for hits).
265. See Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 16, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html.
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if one wanted to purchase cyanide—think Miss Emily in Faulkner’s A
Rose for Emily266—there was no way to disguise one’s purchase online; 
one went to the one general store that sold it. In this sense, privacy as we 
know it (or at least remember it) is a fairly recent phenomenon, dating to 
the rise of industrialization and the anonymity that came with city 
living.267
This Article’s third response to the “end of privacy” argument is to 
note the alternative. We could continue to live in a world where millions 
of law-abiding citizens “voluntarily” consent, where officers can search 
vehicles with little oversight, and where millions of citizens are stopped 
by the police and frisked by the police. We could even continue to live in 
a world where such policing is decidedly racialized, a type of policing 
that is decidedly inconsistent with our notion that everyone should be 
equal before the law. Or we could live in a world where all of us surrender 
some privacy in exchange for judicial review, transparency, and accuracy 
in policing. In short, in exchange for more egalitarian policing.268 That is 
the alternative. I, for one, know which world I prefer.
CONCLUSION
The ambition of this Article has been to challenge conventional 
thinking about technology and to offer another way to think about the 
relationship between technology and the constellation of rights we 
associate with the Fourth Amendment. Deployed properly, techno-
policing can provide doctrinal assists where Fourth Amendment doctrine 
alone has proved inadequate, shortsighted, and unfair. Some of the 
arguments are hopefully noncontroversial. Others—for example, the 
more widespread use of surveillance cameras, terahertz scanners, Big 
Data, and Automated Suspicion Algorithms—are sure to engender
pushback. But at a time when crime levels are relatively low269 and police 
accountability is coming to the fore, at a time when both conservatives 
and progressives are rethinking criminal justice, at a time of perhaps 
interest convergence,270 and at a time when looking to the Supreme Court 
to fill doctrinal gaps seems foolhardy, techno-policing is certainly worth 
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considering, discussing, and debating. Because just possibly, technology 
can play a role in “mak[ing] America what America must become”271—
fair, egalitarian, responsive to needs of all of its citizens, and truly 
democratic in all respects, including its policing. The goal of this Article
has been to begin the conversation. Hopefully, it has done just that.
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here, and will again, and we can make America what America must become.”).
47
Capers: Policing, Technology, and Doctrinal Assists
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
48
Florida Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol69/iss3/2
